Compositional and Abstraction-Based Approach for Synthesis of Edit
  Functions for Opacity Enforcement by Mohajerani, Sahar et al.
1Compositional and Abstraction-Based Approach for Synthesis of
Edit Functions for Opacity Enforcement
Sahar Mohajerani, Yiding Ji and Ste´phane Lafortune
Abstract—This paper develops a novel compositional and
abstraction-based approach to synthesize edit functions for opac-
ity enforcement in modular discrete event systems. Edit functions
alter the output of the system by erasing or inserting events in
order to obfuscate the outside intruder, whose goal is to infer
the secrets of the system from its observation. We synthesize edit
functions to solve the opacity enforcement problem in a modular
setting, which significantly reduces the computational complexity
compared with the monolithic approach. Two abstraction meth-
ods called opaque observation equivalence and opaque bisimu-
lation are first employed to abstract the individual components
of the modular system and their observers. Subsequently, we
propose a method to transform the synthesis of edit functions to
the calculation of modular supremal nonblocking supervisors. We
show that the edit functions synthesized in this manner correctly
solve the opacity enforcement problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opacity characterizes whether the integrity of the secrets of
a system can be preserved from the inference of an outside
intruder, potentially with malicious purposes. The intruder is
modeled as a passive observer with knowledge of the system’s
structure. A system is called opaque if the intruder is unable
to infer the system’s secrets from its observation.
Starting with [2], [3] in the computer science literature,
opacity has been extensively studied, especially in the field
of discrete event systems (DES), under multiple frameworks.
For finite state automaton models, various notions of opacity
have been studied, e.g., language-based opacity [22], current-
state opacity [34], initial-state opacity [36], K-step opacity [49]
and infinite-step opacity [33]. Opacity has also been discussed
in some other system models, like infinite state systems [6],
modular systems [24] and Petri nets [42], [43]. Opacity under a
special observer called Orwellian observer is discussed in [30]
and opacity under powerful attackers is studied in [14]. A
more recent work [51] investigates opacity for networked
supervisory control systems. Furthermore, some works in-
vestigate opacity in stochastic settings, e.g., [1], [7], [21],
[45]. Specifically, [52] presents a novel approach to tackle
infinite-step and K-step opacity in stochastic DES. The survey
paper [16] summarizes some recent results on opacity in DES.
When opacity does not hold, it is natural to study its
enforcement [10]. One popular approach is supervisory con-
trol [8], [9], [35], [41], [48], where some behaviors of the
system are disabled before they reveal the secrets. Another
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widely-applied method is sensor activation [5], [50], [53],
where the observability of events is dynamically changed.
Recently, a new enforcement method called insertion func-
tion was proposed in [46], which inserts fictitious events into
the output of the system to obfuscate the intruder. The authors
of [18] extended the method to study opacity enforcement
under the assumption that the intruder may or may not know
the implementation of insertion functions, while [19] discussed
opacity enforcement by insertion functions under quantitative
constraints. As a following work, [47] investigates a more
general method called edit functions, which manipulate the
output of the system by either inserting or erasing events.
Then [17], [20] considers the case when the edit function’s
implementation is known to the intruder. As a summary and
extension, [20] characterizes opacity enforcement by edit func-
tions as a three-player game and proposes a novel information
structure called three-player observer (TPO) to embed edit
functions. A special TPO called the All Edit Structure (AES)
is also introduced in [20] to characterize the edit constraints.
In this work, we elaborate the method in [20] to study
opacity enforcement in a modular setting. Our motivation is as
follows. To generate a three-player observer, the observer of
the system needs to be calculated, which is potentially costly
in computation. Furthermore, modern engineering systems
usually contain multiple components that are synchronized
and subject to malicious inference. In this sense, if we are
to apply edit functions to enforce opacity, heavy computation
is involved both from determining individual systems and
synchronizing them, which may be potentially cumbersome.
To alleviate this issue, this paper applies a compositional
and abstraction-based method to reduce the size of the modular
system before calculating the All Edit Structure. Bisimulation
and observation equivalence [25] are well-known methods to
abstract the state space of an automaton, while they do not
preserve opacity properties in general. As a variant, [54] pro-
poses several innovative concepts termed opacity-preserving
(bi)simulation relations to reduce the state space of the system
in opacity verification. A compositional visible bisimulation
equivalence method is discussed in [31] for abstraction-based
opacity verification.
For abstraction, we introduce opaque observation equiva-
lence and opaque bisimulation, which consider the secrecy
status of states when merging them. In our framework, each
individual system is abstracted using opaque observation
equivalence. After that, the observer is calculated. Since ab-
straction reduces the size of the state space, the computational
complexity of calculating the observer is lowered potentially.
Next, opaque bisimulation is employed to the observer of each
abstracted individual system, resulting in the smallest possible
automaton for future discussion.
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We further leverage some results from supervisor reduction
and modular supervisory control theory to reduce the complex-
ity of supervisor synthesis. There is a rich literature on both
topics, see, e.g., [23], [28], [37], [39], [40]. The main idea is to
convert the construction of the monolithic All Edit Structure
to a modular supervisory control problem. Specifically, we
first transfer each individual three-player observer (without
considering edit constraints) to its automaton form and view
the set of interacting automata as the “plant” to be controlled.
Then we put the edit constraint as the specification, also in
an automaton form. Afterwards, we perform modular supervi-
sory control to synthesize a least restrictive and nonblocking
modular supervisor. It is shown that all the traces accepted
by the supervisor represent valid edit decisions contained in
the monolithic AES. Compared with the conventional mono-
lithic approach for supervisor synthesis [4], our compositional
approach is more efficient in computation.
The presentation of this work is organized as follows.
Section II gives a brief background introduction about the
system model, supervisory control theory and edit functions.
The general idea of the paper is presented in Sect. III as a
flow chart. Section IV explains the abstraction methods and
synchronization of three-player observers. Next, Section V
transforms the calculation of the monolithic All Edit Structure
to the calculation of a modular supervisor. Finally, some
concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
A preliminary and partial version of this work appears
in [26]. The current work improves [26] in the sense that [26]
only considers abstraction methods to synthesize edit functions
in a monolithic setting, while this work also takes synchronous
composition into consideration and the edit functions are
synthesized by a modular approach.
II. MODELING FORMALISM AND BACKGROUND
A. Events, Automata and their Composition
In this work, we consider discrete event systems modeled
as deterministic or nondeterministic automata.
Definition 1: A (nondeterministic) finite-state automaton is
a tuple G = 〈Σ,Q,→,Q0〉, where Σ is a finite set of events,
Q is a finite set of states, → ⊆ Q× Σ × Q is the state
transition relation, and Q0 ⊆ Q is the set of initial states.
G is deterministic if |Q0|= 1 and if x σ→ y1 and x σ→ y2 always
implies that y1 = y2.
When state marking is considered, the above definition is
extended to G= 〈Σ,Q,→,Q0,Qm〉, where Qm ⊆Q is the set of
marked states. In this paper, we identify marked states using
gray shading in the figures.
We assume that the system is partially observed, thus the
concepts of observable and unobservable events are intro-
duced. Since the exact identity of unobservable events is
irrelevant in our later discussion of opacity, they are uniformly
represented by a special event τ . The event τ is never included
in the alphabet Σ, unless explicitly mentioned. For this reason,
Στ = Σ∪{τ} is used to represent the whole set of observable
and unobservable events. Hereafter, nondeterministic automata
may contain transitions labeled by τ , while deterministic
automata never contain τ transitions. Moreover, Pτ : Σ∗τ → Σ∗
is the projection that removes from strings in Σ∗τ all the τ
events.
When automata are brought together to interact, lock-step
synchronization in the style of [15] is used.
Definition 2: Let G1 = 〈Σ1,Q1,→1,Q01,Qm1 〉 and G2 =
〈Σ2,Q2,→2,Q02,Qm2 〉 be two nondeterministic automata. The
synchronous composition of G1 and G2 is defined as
G1 ‖G2 :=
〈
Σ1∪Σ2,Q1×Q2,→,Q01×Q02,Qm1 ×Qm2
〉
(1)
where
(x1,x2)
σ→ (y1,y2) if σ ∈ (Σ1∩Σ2),
x1
σ→1 y1, and x2 σ→2 y2 ;
(x1,x2)
σ→ (y1,x2) if σ ∈ (Σ1 \Σ2) ∪{τ}
and x1
σ→1 y1 ;
(x1,x2)
σ→ (x1,y2) if σ ∈ (Σ2 \Σ1) ∪{τ}
and x2
σ→2 y2 .
Importantly, synchronous composition only imposes lock-
step synchronization on common events from Σ1 and Σ2.
The transition relation of an automaton G is written in infix
notation x σ→ y, and it is extended to strings in Σ∗τ by letting
x ε→ x for all x∈Q, and x tσ→ z if x t→ y and y σ→ z for some y∈
Q. Furthermore, x t→ means that x t→ y for some y ∈ Q, and
x→ y means that x t→ y for some t ∈ Σ∗τ . These notations also
apply to state sets, where X t→ Y for X ,Y ⊆ Q means that
x t→ y for some x ∈ X and y ∈Y , and to automata, where G t→
means that Q0 t→ (t is defined in G) and G t→ x means Q0 t→ x.
For brevity, p s⇒ q for s ∈ Σ∗ represents the existence of a
string t ∈ Σ∗τ such that Pτ(t) = s and p t→ q. Thus, q u→ p for
u ∈ Σ∗τ means a path containing exactly the events in u, while
q u⇒ p for u ∈ Σ∗ means existence of a path between p and q
with an arbitrary number of τ events between the observable
events in u. Similarly, p τ⇒ q means the existence of a string
t ∈ {τ}∗ such that p t→ q.
The language of an automaton G is defined as L (G) =
{s ∈ Σ∗ |G s⇒} and the language generated by G from q ∈Q
is L (G,q) = {s ∈ Σ∗ | q s⇒}, thus we do not include event τ
in the language of an automaton. Moreover, we also introduce
projections Pi for i = 1,2, which are Pi : (Σ1 ∪Σ2)∗→ Σ∗i for
i = 1,2.
For a nondeterministic automaton G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q0〉, the
set of unobservably reached states of B ∈ 2Q, is UR(B) =⋃{C ⊆ Q | B τ⇒ C}. Its observer det(G) = 〈Σ,Xobs,→obs
,X0obs〉 is a deterministic automaton, where X0obs = UR(Q0)
and Xobs ⊆ 2Q, and X σ→obs Y , where X ,Y ∈ Xobs, if and only
if Y =
⋃{UR(y) | x σ→ y for some x ∈ X and y ∈ Q}. By
convention, only reachable states from X0obs under →obs are
considered in this paper. We also refer to the observer as the
(current-state) estimator of the system while an observer state
is referred to as (current-state) estimate.
A common automaton operation is the quotient modulo,
which is an equivalence relation on sets of states.
Definition 3: Let Z be a set. A relation ∼⊆ Z×Z is called
an equivalence relation on Z if it is reflexive, symmetric,
and transitive. Given an equivalence relation ∼ on Z, the
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equivalence class of z ∈ Z is [z] = {z′ ∈ Z | z ∼ z′ }, and
Z˜ = { [z] | z∈ Z } is the set of all equivalence classes modulo ∼.
Definition 4: Let G = 〈Σ,Q,→,Q0〉 be an automaton and
let ∼ ⊆ Q × Q be an equivalence relation. The quotient
automaton of G modulo ∼ is G˜ = 〈Σ, Q˜,→/∼, Q˜0〉, where
→/∼= {([x],σ , [y]) | x σ→ y} and Q˜0 = { [x0] | x0 ∈ Q0 }.
In order to compare automata structurally, we say that an
automaton is a subautomaton of another automaton if all states
and transitions in the first automaton are contained in the
second one. Formally, we have the following definition:
Definition 5: Let G1 =
〈
Στ ,Q1,→1,Q01,Qm1
〉
and G2 =〈
Στ ,Q2,→2,Q02,Qm2
〉
be two automata. G1 is a subautomaton
of G2, denoted by G1 vG2, if Q1 ⊆Q2, →1 ⊆→2, Q01 ⊆Q02,
and Qm1 ⊆ Qm2 .
B. Supervisory Control Theory
Considering plant G and specification K, supervisory con-
trol theory provides a method to synthesize a supervisor to
restrict the behavior of the plant such that the given spec-
ification is always fulfilled. The supervisor S is a function
defined from the language of the system G to the set of
events, formally, S :L (G)→ 2Σ. We also partition the set of
events as uncontrollable events and controllable events, i.e.,
Σ= Σuc∪Σc, where uncontrollable events cannot be disabled
by the supervisor. In the figures the uncontrollable events
are marked by an exclamation mark (!). The readers may
refer to [4] for the main results of monolithic supervisory
control under full observation. Here we focus on concepts
and definitions relevant to the present paper and the synthesis
procedure in this paper is done on deterministic automata.
Two requirements for the supervisor are controllability and
nonblockingness, where controllability captures safety in the
presence of uncontrollable events and nonblockingness focuses
on liveness of the system.
Definition 6: [4] Let G =
〈
Σ,QG,→G,Q0G,QmG
〉
and K =〈
Σ,QK ,→K ,Q0K ,QmK
〉
be two deterministic automata such that
K v G. K is controllable w.r.t. G if, for all states x ∈ QK and
y ∈ QG and for every uncontrollable event υ ∈ Σuc such that
x υ→G y, it also holds that x υ→K y.
Definition 7: [4] Let G be a deterministic automaton. A
state x is called reachable in G if G→ x, and coreachable in G
if x→Qm. The automaton G is called reachable or coreachable
if every state in G has this property. G is called nonblocking
if every reachable state is coreachable.
The upper bound of controllable and nonblocking subau-
tomata is again controllable and nonblocking. This implies the
existence of a least restrictive subautomaton of the original
system, which is achieved by the maximally-permissive and
nonblocking supervisor.
Definition 8: Let G be an automaton, the supremal control-
lable and nonblocking subautomaton of G is called the supre-
mal supervisor, denoted by supC(G) where for all controllable
and nonblocking automata K w.r.t. G, K v supC(G).
Synthesis of supC(G) is done by iteratively removing block-
ing and uncontrollable states, until a fixed point is reached,
and restricting the final automaton to the remaining states and
their associated transitions, for more details please see [4],
[13], [44].
In this paper, we assume that the modular system has a set
of interacting components {G1, . . . ,Gn}, and there is also a set
of supervisors in a modular structure, i.e., S = {S1, . . . ,Sn}.
Here supervisor Si is responsible for controlling Gi. The set
of modular supervisors may be synchronized as
∥∥n
i=1 Si.
C. Opacity and Edit Functions
In this work, we suppose system G has certain secret
information which is characterized by the set of states. Thus
the state space is partitioned into two disjoint subsets: Q =
QS ∪QNS where QS is the set of secret states capturing the
secrets of the system, while QNS is the set of non-secret states.
When the system G is modular, G = {G1, . . . ,G2}, the set of
secret states of the system, QS, is QS = {(x1, . . . ,xn) |∃xi ∈
QSi }.
Suppose there is an external intruder modeled as the ob-
server of the system, which intends to infer the secrets of the
system from its observation. Then a system is called opaque
if the intruder is unable to determine unambiguously if the
system has entered a secret state or not. Different notions of
opacity have been introduced in literature and we focus on
current-state opacity in this work.
Definition 9: A nondeterministic automaton G with a set
of secret states QS is current-state opaque w.r.t. QS if (∀s ∈
L (G,q0) : Q0 s⇒ QS) then [ Q0 s⇒ QNS].
The system is current-state opaque if for any string reaching
a secret state there is string with the same sequence of
observable events reaching a non-secret state. It is known that
current-state opacity can be verified by building the standard
observer automaton.
Theorem 1: Let G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q◦〉 be a nondeterminis-
tic automaton with set of secret states QS. Let det(G) =
〈Σ,Xobs,→obs,X0obs〉 be the current-state estimator of G. Then
G is current-state opaque w.r.t. QS if and only if [det(G) s→
X implies that X 6⊆ QS].
If all states violating current-state opacity are removed
from the observer det(G), then the accessible part of the
remaining structure is called the desired observer, denoted
by detd(G) = 〈Σ,Xobsd ,→obsd ,X0obsd〉. The language generated
by the desired observer is referred to as the safe language,
Lsafe = L (detd(G)). Accordingly, we also define the unsafe
language, Lunsafe =L (G)\Lsafe.
If a system is not current state opaque then an interface
based approach called edit function [20], [47] may be applied
to enforce it. An edit function may insert events into the output
of the system or erase events from the output of the system.
It is assumed that the intruder fails to distinguish between an
inserted event and its genuine counterpart. Let Σr = {σ →
ε : σ ∈ Σ} be the set of “event erasure” events.
Definition 10: A deterministic edit function is defined as
fe : Σ∗×Σ→ Σ∗. Given s ∈L (G), σ ∈ Σ,
fe(s,σ) =

sIσ if sI is inserted before σ
ε nothing is inserted and σ is erased
sI if sI is inserted and σ is erased
With an abuse of notation, we also define a string-based edit
function fˆe recursively as: fˆe(ε) = ε , fˆe(sσ) = fˆe(s) fe(s,σ)
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for s ∈ Σ∗ and σ ∈ Σ. In the sequel, to ease the notational
burden, we will drop the “ ˆ ” in fˆe and it will be clear
from the argument(s) of fe which function we are referring
to (incremental single-event one or string-based one).
Two notions termed public safety and private safety were
defined in [20] to characterize the behavior of edit functions. In
this paper, we consider private safety alone under the assump-
tion that the intruder does not know about the implementation
of an edit function.
Definition 11 (Private Safety): Given G and its observer
det(G), an edit function fe is privately safe if ∀s∈L (det(G)),
fe(s) ∈ Lsafe.
Recently a three-player game structure called three-player
observer (TPO) w.r.t. the system was defined in [20] to embed
edit functions. For the sake of completeness, we recall this
definition (more details are available in [20]).
Definition 12 (Three-player Observer): Given a system G
with its observer det(G) and desired observer detd(G),
let I ⊆ Xobsd × Xobs be the set of information states. A
three-player observer w.r.t. G is a tuple of the form T =
(QY ,QZ ,QW ,Σ,Σr,Θ,→yz,→zz,→zw,→wy,y0), where:
• QY ⊆ I is the set of Y states.
• QZ ⊆ I×Σ is the set of Z states. Let I(z), E(z) denote the
information state component and observable event com-
ponent of a Z state z respectively, so that z= (I(z),E(z)).
• QW ⊆ I × (Σ ∪ Σr) is the set of W -states. Let I(w),
A(w) denote the information state component and ac-
tion component of a W state w respectively, so that
w = (I(w),A(w)).
• Σ is the set of observable events.
• Σr is the set of event-erasure events.
• Θ⊆ Σ∪{ε}∪Σr is the set of edit decisions at Z states.
(i) →yz: QY × Σ×QZ is the transition function from Y
states to Z states. For y = (xd ,x f ) ∈ QY , eo ∈ Σ, we
have: y eo→yz z⇒ [x f eo→obs]∧ [I(z) = y]∧ [E(z) = eo].
(ii) →zz: QZ ×Θ×QZ is the transition function from Z
states to Z states. For z= ((xd ,x f ),eo)∈QZ , θ ∈Θ, we
have: z θ→zz z′⇒ [θ ∈ Σ]∧ [I(z′) = (x′d ,x f )]∧ [xd
θ→detd
x′d ]∧ [E(z′) = eo].
(iii) →zw1: QZ×Θ×QW is the ε insertion transition func-
tion from Z states to W states. For z = ((xd ,x f ),eo) ∈
QZ , θ ∈ Θ we have: z θ→zw1 w ⇒ [θ = ε]∧ [I(w) =
I(z)]∧ [A(w) = eo]∧ [xd eo→detd ]∧ [x f
eo→obs].
(iv) →zw2: QZ×Θ×QW is the event erasure transition func-
tion from Z states to W states. For z = ((xd ,x f ),eo) ∈
QZ , θ ∈Θ, we have: z θ→zw2 w⇒ [θ = eo→ ε]∧ [I(w)=
I(z)]∧ [A(w) = eo→ ε]∧ [x f eo→obs].
(v) →wy1: QW ×Σ×QY is the transition function from W
states whose action component is in Σ to Y states. For
w = ((xd ,x f ),eo) ∈ QW , we have: w eo→wy1 y ⇒ [y =
(x′d ,x
′
f )]∧ [xd
eo→detd x′d ]∧ [x f
eo→obs x′f ].
(vi) →wy2: QW ×Σ×QY is the transition function from W
states whose action component is in Σr to Y states. For
w= ((xd ,x f ),eo→ ε)∈QW , we have: w eo→wy2 y⇒ [y=
(xd ,x′f )]∧ [x f
eo→obs x′f ].
• y0 = (xobsd,0,xobs,0) ∈ QY is the initial state of T , where
xobsd,0 and xobs,0 are initial states of detd(G) and det(G),
respectively.
In general, a three-player observer characterizes a game be-
tween a dummy player, the edit function and the environment
(system). The state space of a TPO is partitioned as: QY states
(Y states) where the dummy player plays; QZ states (Z states)
where the edit function plays; QW states (W states) where the
environment plays. A Y state contains the intruder’s estimate
(left component) as well as the system’s true state estimate
(right component). A →yz transition is defined out of a Y
state, indicating that an observable event may occur and thus
is received by the edit function. Then the TPO transits to a Z
state and the turn of the game is passed to the edit function.
Notice that the observable event does not really occur and
this dummy player is only introduced to help determine the
decisions of edit functions.
At a Z state, the edit function may choose to insert certain
events (including ε) or erase its last observed event. If a non-ε
event is inserted, a →zz transition leads the TPO to another Z
state, which means the edit function still has the turn to insert
more events until it decides to stop insertion by inserting ε
or by erasing the last observed event. There may be multiple
transitions defined out of a Z state, i.e., multiple edit decisions;
we write Θ(z) to denote the set of edit decisions defined at
z ∈ QZ in a TPO.
If the edit function inserts nothing (respectively erases
the event it receives from the dummy player), then a →zw1
(respectively (→zw2)) transition is defined and the TPO is
at a W state. Then the environment plays by letting the
observable event executed from its preceding Y state occur.
Correspondingly, there are also two types of →wy transitions,
where →wy1 indicates that the executed observable event will
be observed by the intruder while →wy2 indicates that the
executed observable event will not be observed by the intruder
since it has been erased by the edit function.
When the three players take turns to play, the components
of each player’s states also get updated. From Def. 12, a →yz
transition does not change the state estimates for the intruder
or the system since the player at Y states is dummy and the
observable events from Y states do not really occur. With a→zz
transition, only xd is updated since xd is the estimate of the
intruder and event insertion only alters the observation of the
intruder. For →zw transitions, we only require the observable
event to be defined at xd or x f . Finally, a →wy1 transition
updates both xd and x f while a →wy1 transition only updates
x f as the intruder does not observe the erased event. To
characterize the information flow in a TPO, the notion of run
is defined in [20].
Definition 13 (Run): In a three-player observer T , a run
is defined as: ω = y0
e0−→ z10
θ10−→ z20
θ20−→ ·· · θ
m0−1
0−−−→ zm00
θm00−−→
w0
e0−→ y1 e1−→ z11
θ11−→ z21
θ21−→ ·· ·zm11
θm11−−→ w1 e1−→ y2 · · · en−→ z1n
θ1n−→
·· ·zmnn θ
mn
n−−→wn en−→ yn+1, where y0 is the initial state of T , ei ∈Σ,
θ ji ∈Θ(z ji ), ∀0≤ i≤ n, 1≤ j ≤ mi and n ∈ N, mi ∈ N+.
We let ΩT be the set of all runs in a TPO T . For simplicity,
similar notations as for automata are defined for three-player
observers and thus T ω→ x denotes the existence of a run in a
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three-player observer. We also review the concepts of string
generated by a run and edit projection defined in [20].
Definition 14 (String Generated by a Run): Given a run ω
as in Definition 13, the string generated by ω is defined as:
l(ω) = θ 10 θ
2
0 · · ·θm0−10 θm00 e0θ 11 · · ·θm11 e1 · · ·en−1θ 1n · · ·θmnn en,
where ∀i≤ n, θmii ei = ε if θmii = ei→ ε .
Definition 15 (Edit Projection): Given TPO T and run ωT
as in Def. 13, the edit projection Pe : Ω→L (G) is defined
such that Pe(ωT ) = e0e1 · · ·en.
In a TPO, y∈QY is a terminating state if 6 ∃eo ∈ Σ, s.t. y eo→.
And w∈QW is a deadlocking state if 6 ∃eo ∈ Σ, s.t. w eo→ y. Also
z ∈QZ is a deadlocking state if 6 ∃θ ∈Θ, s.t. z θ→ z′ or z θ→ w.
We call a TPO T complete [20] if there are no deadlocking
W or Z states in T and ∀s ∈L (G), ∃ω ∈ΩT , s.t. Pe(ω) = s.
Definition 16 (Edit Function Embedded in TPO): Given a
TPO T , a deterministic edit function fe is embedded in T
if ∀s ∈L (G), ∃ω ∈ΩT , s.t. Pe(ω) = s and l(ω) = fe(s).
Next, we construct the largest three-player observer in the
sense that all the other three-player observers are subautomata
of it. Such a notion is well defined by considering all admis-
sible transitions at every state of the TPO, according to the
respective conditions in Def. 12.
Edit functions are designed to erase genuine events or insert
fictitious ones to mislead the intruder. In theory, it is possible to
design an edit function that erases all the events of the system,
although this is not desirable. To avoid this situation usually
the user provides some constraints on the edit functions. The
constraint that is considered in this paper is to limit the number
of consecutive erasures.
Definition 17 (Edit Constraint): The edit constraint, de-
noted by Φ, requires that the edit function should not make
n+1 consecutive erasures where n ∈ N.
Finally, we define the All Edit Structure (AES) [20] by
considering the edit constraint. A synthesis procedure was
also presented in [20] to construct the AES. Notice that the
following definition is slightly different from the AES in the
preliminary version of this work [26] since edit constraints are
not considered in [26].
Definition 18 (All Edit Structure): Given system G, ob-
server det(G) and desired estimator detd(G), the All Edit
Structure is defined to be the largest complete three-player
observer w.r.t. G, which satisfies the edit constraint.
From results in [20], private safety is achievable when the
AES is not empty by construction. Hereafter, we assume that
the AES is non-empty in the following discussion; if it is
empty, then opacity cannot be enforced by the mechanism of
edit functions. It was also proven in [20] that all privately safe
edit functions satisfying edit constraints are embedded in the
AES. Formally speaking, the following result holds.
Theorem 2: Given a system G and its corresponding AES
under edit constraint Φ, an edit function fe is privately safe
and satisfies Φ if and only if fe ∈ AES.
We end this section by briefly reviewing the pruning process
discussed in [20] to construct the AES. The presence of
edit constraints may preclude some undesired states from the
AES, thus leaving some states without outgoing transitions,
i.e.,“deadlock” Z or W states. Those states reflect the inability
of the edit function to issue a valid edit decision (for insertion
or erasure) while still maintaining opacity for all possible
future behaviors, thus should be removed in the pruning
process. Moreover, Y states that have transitions to a deadlock
Z state need to be pruned as well, since Y -states are the states
where the system issues an output event and the edit function
is not allowed to prevent their occurrence.
The construction of the AES may also be interpreted as the
calculation of a supervisor where the “plant” is the largest
three-player observer in terms of subautomaton, including all
potentially feasible edit decisions without considering edit
constraints. The Y states are considered as marked states.
The events labeling transitions from Y states to Z states and
from W states to Y states are considered as uncontrollable,
while the events labeling transitions from Z states to Z states
and Z states to W states are viewed as controllable. We also
define the proper specification by considering edit constraints,
deleting states that violate them, and taking the trim of the
resulting structure. The goal is to calculate the least restrictive,
controllable and nonblocking supervisor based on the plant and
this specification. Similar processes of pruning game structures
akin to TPOs were discussed in prior work, e.g., [18], [20],
[46]. We will leverage this approach in the following discus-
sion, but in the framework of modular supervisory control.
III. COMPOSITIONAL ABSTRACTION-BASED
METHODOLOGY
This section presents our novel compositional and
abstraction-based methodology for synthesizing modular form
edit functions based on individual three-player observers after
abstracting the original system. For simplicity, we call this
methodology the CA-AES (Composition Abstraction-All Edit
Structure) Algorithm hereafter. The input of the algorithm is
a set of nondetermistic automata, G = {G1, . . . ,Gn} and the
output is a modular representation of edit functions, which is
called Modular Edit Structure. The algorithm is summarized
in Figure 1 and its steps are as follows. We will explain how
to interpret the modular representation of edit functions later.
(i) The algorithm first abstracts each individual automaton,
Gi, using opaque observation equivalence. This results in
G˜i, which has fewer states and transitions compared to
the original automaton.
(ii) Next, we abstract the observer of G˜i, i.e., det(G˜i), by
opaque bisimulation and bisimulation, resulting in two
abstracted deterministic automata Hi,ob and Hi,b.
(iii) Then we calculate the abstracted desired observer of Gi
from Hi,ob, which is denoted by Hi,obd .
(iv) Afterward, the largest (abstracted) three-player observer
of each individual component Gi is calculated from
the abstracted observer Hi,b and the abstracted desired
observer Hi,obd , and it is denoted by T POi.
(v) The final step is to calculate a modular nonblocking
and controllable supervisor, then obtain a set of modular
edit functions. This is done by transforming the largest
three-player observers and the edit constraint to a set
of automata, i.e., GTi and K, respectively. This modular
approach is in contrast to calculating monolithic edit
functions embedded in the monolithic AES [20].
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Modular Edit Structure:S1 ‖ · · · ‖Sm
input : {G1, · · · ,Gn} and Φ
Fig. 1. The steps of Algorithm CA-AES.
Specifically, in step (iv), each abstracted three-player ob-
server w.r.t. the corresponding individual system together
with the constraint Φ are transformed to a set of interacting
automata. Then in step (v), a modular supremal controllable
and nonblocking supervisor is calculated, thereby fulfilling
the edit constraint in the composed structure. Consequently,
the Modular Edit Structure is itself a modular supervisor.
Regarding step (v), it is possible to leverage existing efficient
algorithms on modular supervisory control to calculate the
Modular Edit Structure.
In the monolithic approach of calculating the AES, indi-
vidual systems G1 through Gn are synchronized first and then
the observer of the synchronized system is built. Since the
computational complexity of calculating the observer is expo-
nential, synchronizing individual components before building
the observer significantly increases the complexity, which may
be 2∏
n
i=1 |Qi| in the worst case where |Qi| is the cardinality of
Qi. Moreover, constructing the All Edit Structure is polynomial
in terms of the state space of the observer, which may be
potentially intractable when we deal with the synchronized
system. In contrast, our compositional and abstraction-based
approach reduces computational cost considerably both from
abstracting individual systems and conducting computation in
a modular way. However, as will be demonstrated later, some
edit decisions may be omitted in the Modular Edit Structure
output by Algorithm CA-AES.
The presented approach relies heavily on the use of three-
player observers. We present an example to better understand
the structure of such observers.
Example 1: Consider the nondeterministic automaton G1
with secret states set QS1 = {q3}, shown in Fig. 2. To generate
the three-player observer of G1, first the observer of G1 needs
to be built, which is shown as det(G1) in Fig. 2. To generate
the desired observer the state {q3} ⊆QS1 needs to be removed.
The desired observer detd(G1) is shown in Fig. 2.
Then we follow the procedures in [20] to build the TPO
w.r.t. det(G1) in Fig. 2 (labeled as T ′1). As is discussed, the
game on the TPO is initiated from Y -state (q0,q0) where the
dummy player executes the observable event γ (the only event
defined at q0 in det(G1)). Then the edit function takes the turn
to play at the Z state (q0,q0,γ) where it has two choices: insert
nothing or erase γ . If γ is erased, then theW state (q0,q0,γ→
ε) is reached where the environment plays by executing γ .
Then the turn is passed back to the dummy player and the
rest of the structure is interpreted similarly.
The compositional abstraction-based approach is explained
in more details in the following sections. First, in Section IV,
we discuss abstractions at the component level and synchro-
nization of individual three-player observers, formalizing steps
(i)-(iv) of Algorithm CA-AES. Then, in Section V, we discuss
the last step of Algorithm CA-AES.
IV. SYNCHRONIZATION AND ABSTRACTION
OPERATIONS
This section presents results on abstraction and composi-
tion that support steps (i)-(iv) of Algorithm CA-CAS. First,
Sect. IV-A describes the methods to abstract nondeterministic
automata and their observers. Next, Sect. IV-B describes the
process of transforming every individual three-player observer
to an automaton form and shows that the automaton represen-
tation is a substructure (in the sense of subgraph) of the largest
monolithic three-player observer.
A. Opaque observation equivalence
The first strategy used in Algorithm CA-AES to alleviate
state space explosion is abstraction of system components.
This subsection contains a collection of abstraction methods
that can be used to abstract nondeterministc automata and
their observers such that the abstracted observers and the
desired observers are bisimilar to their original counterparts.
The abstraction methods are based on bisimulation and obser-
vation equivalence, which are computationally efficient and
can be calculated in polynomial-time [12]. We will prove in
Theorem 5 that if we build the largest three-player observer
based on the abstracted observer and the desired observer, we
obtain the same runs, consequently the same edit functions
6
Fig. 1. The steps of Algorithm CA-AES.
Specifically, in step (iv), each abstracted three-player ob-
server w.r.t. the corresponding individual system together
with the constraint Φ are transformed to a set of interacting
automata. Then in step (v), a m dular supremal controllable
and nonblocking supervisor is calcul ted, thereby fulfilling
the edit constraint in the composed structure. Consequently,
the Modular Edit Structure is itself a modular supervisor.
Regarding step (v), it is possible to leverage existing efficient
algorithms on modular s pervisory ontrol to c lculate
Modular Edit Structure.
In the monolithic approach of calculating the AES, indi-
vidual systems G1 through Gn are synchronized first and then
the observer of the synchronized system is built. Since the
computational complexity of calculating the observer is expo-
nential, synchronizing individual components before building
the observer significantly increases the complexity, which may
be 2∏
n
i=1 |Qi| in the worst case where |Qi| is the cardinality of
Qi. Moreover, constructing the All Edit Structure is polynomial
in terms of the state space of the observer, which may be
potentially intractable when we deal with the synchronized
system. In contrast, our compositional and abstraction-based
approach reduces computational cost considerably both from
abstracting individual systems and conducting computation in
a modular way. However, as will be demonstrated later, some
edit decisions may be omitted in the Modular Edit Structure
output by Algorithm CA-AES.
The pres nted appro ch relies heavily on the use of three-
player observers. We present an example to better understand
the structure of such observers.
Example 1: Consider the nondeterministic automaton G1
w th secret states set QS1 = {q3}, shown in Fig. 2. To generate
the three-player observer of G1, first the observer of G1 needs
to be built, which is shown as det(G1) in Fig. 2. To generate
the desired observer the state {q3} ⊆QS1 needs to be removed.
The desire obs rver d td(G1) is show in Fig. 2.
Then we follow the procedures in [20] to build the TPO
w.r.t. det(G1) in Fig. 2 (labeled as T ′1). As is discussed, the
game on the TPO is initiated from Y -state (q0,q0) where the
dummy play r executes the observable event γ (the only event
defined at q0 in det(G1)). Then the edit function takes the turn
to play at the Z state (q0,q0,γ) where it has two choices: insert
nothing or erase γ . If γ is erased, then the W state (q0,q0,γ→
ε) is reached where the e vironm n plays by executing γ .
Then the turn is passed back to the dummy player and the
rest of the structure is interpreted similarly.
The compositional abstraction-based approach is explained
in more deta ls in the following sections. First, in Section IV,
we discuss abstractions at the component level and synchro-
nization of individual three-player observers, formalizing steps
(i)-(iv) of Algorithm CA-AES. Then, in Section V, we discuss
the ast step of Algorithm CA-AES.
IV. SYNCHRONIZATION AND ABSTRACTION
OPERATIONS
This s ction prese ts results o abstraction and composi-
tion that support steps (i)-(iv) of Algorithm CA-CAS. First,
Sect. IV-A describes the methods to abstract nondeterministic
automata a d their observers. Next, Sect. IV-B describes the
process f tr nsforming every individual three-player observer
to an automaton form and shows that the automaton represen-
tation is a substructure (in the sense of subgraph) of the largest
monolithic three-player observer.
A. Opaque observation equivalence
The first strategy used in Algorithm CA-AES to alleviate
state pa e explosion is abstraction of system components.
This subsection contains a collection of abstraction methods
that can be used to abstract nondeterministc automata and
their observers such that the abstracted observers and the
desired observers are bi imilar to their original counterparts.
The abstraction methods are based on bisimulation and obser-
vation equivalence, which are computationally efficient and
can be calculated in polynomial-time [12]. We will prove in
Theorem 5 that if we build the largest three-player observer
based on the abstracted observer and the desired observer, we
obtain the same runs, consequently the same edit functions
as we do from the largest three-player observer based on the
original observer and desired observer.
Bisimulation is a widely-used notion of abstraction that
merges states with the same future behavior.
Definition 19: [25] Let G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nonde-
terministic automaton. An equivalence relation ≈ ⊆ Q×Q
is called a bisimulation on G, if the following holds for all
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x1,x2 ∈Q such that x1 ≈ x2: if x1 σ→ y1 for some σ ∈ Στ , then
there exists y2 ∈ Q such that x2 σ→ y2, and y1 ≈ y2.
Bisimulation seeks to merge states with the same outgoing
transitions to equivalent states including unobservable events,
i.e., τ events. If the unobservable events are disregarded, a
more general abstraction method called weak bisimulation or
observation equivalence naturally comes [25].
Definition 20: Let G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterminis-
tic automaton. An equivalence relation ∼ ⊆ Q×Q is called
an observation equivalence on G, if the following holds for
all x1,x2 ∈ Q such that x1 ∼ x2: if x1 s⇒ y1 for some s ∈ Σ∗,
then there exists y2 ∈ Q such that x2 s⇒ y2, and y1 ∼ y2.
In order to use observation equivalence for abstraction
in the opacity setting, the set of secret states needs to be
taken into account. In the following discussion, a restricted
version of observation equivalence called opaque observation
equivalence is employed. This notion was first defined in [27]
in the context of verifying opacity.
Definition 21: Let G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondetermin-
istic automaton with set of secret states QS ⊆ Q and set
of non-secret states QNS = Q \QS. An equivalence relation
∼o ⊆Q×Q is called an opaque observation equivalence on G
with respects to QS, if the following holds for all x1,x2 ∈ Q
such that x1 ∼o x2:
(i) if x1
s⇒ y1 for some s ∈ Σ∗, then there exists y2 ∈Q such
that x2
s⇒ y2, and y1 ∼o y2,
(ii) x1 ∈ QS if and only if x2 ∈ QS.
We also wish to use bisimulation to abstract the observer
of a nondeterministic system. Besides opaque observation
equivalence, opaque bisimulation is also defined.
Definition 22: Let G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterminis-
tic automaton with set of secret states QS ⊆Q and set of non-
secret states QNS = Q\QS. Let det(G) = 〈Σ,Xobs,→obs,X0obs〉
be the observer of G. An equivalence relation ≈o⊆ Xobs×Xobs
is called an opaque bisimulation equivalence on det(G) with
respects to QS, if the following holds for all X1,X2 ∈ Xobs such
that X1 ≈o X2:
(i) if X1
s→ Y1 for some s ∈ Σ∗, then there exists Y2 ∈ Xobs
such that X2
s→ Y2, and Y1 ≈o Y2,
(ii) X1 ⊆ QS if and only if X2 ⊆ QS.
The first step of Algorithm CA-AES is to abstract the system
using opaque observation equivalence. It has been shown in
[32] that if two automata are bisimilar, then their observers
are also bisimilar. In this paper this result is extended such
that abstracting a nondeterministic automaton using opaque
observation equivalence results in an observer and a desired
observer which are bisimilar to the observer and the desired
observer of the original system, respectively.
Proposition 3: Let G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterminis-
tic automaton with set of secret states QS ⊆Q and set of non-
secret states QNS = Q\QS. Let ∼0 be an opaque observation
equivalence on G resulting in G˜ and let ≈ be a bisimulation.
Let detd(G) and detd(G˜) be the desired observer of G and G˜.
Then det(G)≈ det(G˜) and detd(G)≈ detd(G˜).
Proof: First we prove that det(G) ≈ det(G˜). To prove
det(G) ≈ det(G˜) it is enough to show that det(G) s→ X if
and only if det(G˜) s→ X˜ , which implies language equivalence
between det(G) and det(G˜) since det(G) and det(G˜) are
deterministic. This can be shown by induction. Moreover, in
the induction we also show that x∈ X if and only if there exist
[x′] ∈ X˜ such that x ∈ [x′]. This is used for the second part of
the proof, where we show detd(G)≈ detd(G˜).
It is shown by induction on n≥ 0 that X0 σ1→ X1 σ2→ . . . σn→ Xn
in det(G) if and only if X˜0
σ1→ X˜1 σ2→ . . . σn→ X˜n in det(G˜) such
that x∈X j if and only if [x′]∈ X˜k, where x∈ [x′], for 1≤ j≤ n.
Base case: n = 0. Let X0 be the initial state of det(G) and
X˜0 be the initial state of det(G˜). It is shown that x∈ X0 if and
only if there exists [x′] ∈ X˜0 such that x ∈ [x′].
First, let x ∈ X0. Then based on UR(x0), it follows that
there exists x0 ∈Q0 such that x0 τ⇒ x in G. Since G∼o G˜ then
based on Def. 21, there exists [x′0] ∈ X˜0 such that [x′0] τ⇒ [x′]
in G˜ such that x0 ∈ [x′0] and x ∈ [x′]. Then based on UR(x0)
it follows that [x′] ∈ X˜0.
Now let [x′] ∈ X˜0. Then based on UR(x0), it follows that
there exists [x′0]∈Q0 such that [x′0] τ⇒ [x′] in G˜. Since G∼o G˜
then based on Def. 21, there exists x0 ∈ X0 such that x0 τ⇒ x
in G such that x0 ∈ [x′0] and x ∈ [x′]. Then based on UR(x0)
it follows that x ∈ X0.
Inductive step: Assume the claim holds for some n≥ 0, i.e,
X0
σ1σ2...σn−−−−−→ Xn = X in det(G) if and only if X˜ = X˜0 σ1σ2...σn−−−−−→
X˜n = X˜ in det(G˜), such that x ∈ Xk if and only if there exists
[x′]∈ X˜k such that x ∈ [x′] for all 0≤ k < n1. It must be shown
that X = Xn
σn+1−−−→ Y in det(G) if and only if X˜ = X˜n σn+1−−−→ Y˜
in det(G˜) such that x ∈ X if and only if there exists [x′] ∈ X˜
such that x ∈ [x′].
First, let X =Xn
σn+1−−−→Y in det(G) and let x∈X . Then based
on UR(x) it holds that x = x1 τ⇒ ··· τ⇒ xr σn+1−−−→ y in G, where
x j ∈ X for all 1 ≤ j ≤ r and y ∈ Y . Since G ∼o G˜ it holds
that [x′] = [x′1] τ⇒ ··· τ⇒ [x′r] σn+1−−−→ [y′] in G˜ such that x j ∈ [x′ j]
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ r and y ∈ [y′]. Based on UR(x) and inductive
assumption it holds that det(G˜)
σ1σ2...σn−−−−−→ X˜n = X˜ σn+1−−−→ Y˜ and
[x′] ∈ X˜ .
Now let X˜ = X˜n
σn+1−−−→ Y˜ in det(G˜) and let [x] ∈ X˜ . Then
based on UR(x) it holds [x] = [x1] τ⇒ ·· · τ⇒ [xr] σn+1−−−→ [y] in G˜,
where [xi] ∈ X˜ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r and [y] ∈ Y˜ . Since G ∼o G˜ it
holds that x′ = x′1 τ⇒ ··· τ⇒ x′r σn+1−−−→ y′ in G˜ such that x′i ∈ [xi]
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r and y′ ∈ [y]. Based on UR(x) and inductive
assumption it holds that det(G)
σ1σ2...σn−−−−−→ Xn = X σn+1−−−→Y such
that x′ ∈ X .
Now we need to show that detd(G)≈ detd(G˜). It was proven
above that det(G)≈ det(G˜), which means det(G) s→ X if and
only if det(G˜) s→ X˜ and x ∈ X if and only if [x′] ∈ X˜ , where
x ∈ [x′]. Therefore, it is enough to show that X 6∈ Xobsd if and
only if X˜ 6∈ X˜obsd .
First assume X ⊆ QS, which means for all x ∈ X it holds
that x ∈ QS and X 6∈ Xobsd . Since for all x ∈ X it holds that
there exist [x′] ∈ X˜ such that x ∈ [x′] then based on Def. 21
it holds that [x′] ∈ Q˜S. Thus, it can be concluded that for all
[x′] ∈ X˜ it holds that [x′] ∈ Q˜S. This means that X˜ ⊆ Q˜S and
consequently X˜ 6∈ X˜obsd .
1Since the base case of the induction is proven for n = 0, X0 ε→, the
inductive step is considered true for 0≤ k < n.
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Now assume X˜ ⊆ Q˜S, which means for all [x′] ∈ X˜ it holds
that [x′] ∈ Q˜S and X˜ 6∈ X˜obsd . If [x′] ∈ Q˜S then for all x ∈ [x′] it
holds that x ∈QS. Moreover, it was shown above that [x′] ∈ X˜
if and only if x ∈ X , where x ∈ [x′]. Thus, from X˜ ⊆ Q˜S it
follows that X ⊆ QS, which means that X 6∈ Xobsd .
Thus, it can be concluded that detd(G)≈ detd(G˜). 
Opaque observation equivalence seeks to merge states of
a nondeterministc automaton, which are “equivalent”, before
constructing the observer. After calculating the observer, it is
possible to further abstract the observer using opaque bisim-
ulation. This guarantees that the smallest abstracted observer
generates the same language as the original observer. In the
following, Proposition 4 shows that if opaque bisimulation
is used to abstract the observer, then the abstracted desired
observer is also bisimilar to the original desired observer.
Proposition 4: Let G = 〈Στ ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterminis-
tic automaton with set of secret states QS ⊆Q and set of non-
secret states QNS = Q\QS. Let ≈o be an opaque bisimulation
on det(G) resulting in d˜et(G). Let detd(G) and Hd be the
desired observers of det(G) and d˜et(G), respectively. Then
detd(G)≈ Hd , where ≈ is a bisimulation relation.
Proof: Since det(G) ≈o d˜et(G) based on Def. 22 it holds
that det(G) s→ X if and only if d˜et(G) s→ [X ′] and X ∈ [X ′].
Thus, it is enough show that X 6∈ Xobs,detd(G) if and only if
[X ′] 6∈ Xobs,Hd , where X ∈ [X ′].
First assume X ⊆QS, so X 6∈Xobs,detd(G). Then since X ∈ [X ′]
based on Def. 22 it holds that for all X ′ ∈ [X ′], X ′ ⊆QS. This
means [X ′]⊆ QS and consequently [X ′] 6∈ Xobs,Hd .
Then assume [X ′] ⊆ QS, so [X ′] 6∈ Xobs,Hd . Since X ∈ [X ′]
based on Def. 22, X ⊆ QS holds, i.e., X 6∈ Xobs,detd(G). 
We now present the main results of this subsection.
Theorem 5: Let G be a nondeterministic automaton with
secret states QS ⊆ Q and non-secret states QNS = Q\QS. Let
det(G) and detd(G) be the observer and the desired observer of
G, respectively. Let ∼o be an opaque observation equivalence
on G such that G˜∼o G. Let Hob ≈o det(G˜) and Hb ≈ det(G˜)
where ≈o and ≈ are opaque bisimulation and bisimulation,
respectively. Let Hobd be the desired observer of Hob. Let T
be the largest three-player observer w.r.t. det(G) and detd(G),
also let T ′ be the largest three-player observer w.r.t. Hobd and
Hb. Then T
ω→ q if and only if T ′ ω→ q˜.
Proof: From Propositions 3 and 4 it holds that det(G) ≈ Hb
and detd(G)≈ Hobd . Thus, we need to show that a transition
is defined in T if and only if the same transition is defined in
T ′. It is shown by induction on n≥ 0 that y0 ω→ qn in T if and
only if y˜0 ω→ q˜n in T ′.
Base case: (⇒) First assume y0 eo→ z0 in T , where y0 =
(X0obsd ,X
0
obs). Based on Def. 12 it holds that X
0
obs
eo→ in
det(G), I(z0) = y0 and E(z0) = eo. From X0obs
eo→ in det(G)
and since det(G) ≈ Hb it holds that X˜0obs
eo→ in Hb. Thus,
y˜0 = (X˜0obsd , X˜
0
obs) and X˜
0
obs
eo→ in Hb, I(z˜0) = y˜0 and E(z˜0) = eo.
This means y˜0 eo→ z˜0 in T ′.
(⇐) Now assume y˜0 eo→ z˜0 in T ′, where y˜0 = (X˜0obsd , X˜0obs).
The same argument as (⇒) holds.
Inductive step: Assume the claim holds for some n≥ 0, i.e,
n≥ 0 that y0 ω→ qn in T if and only if y˜0 ω→ q˜n in T ′.
(⇒) It must be shown that if qn σ→ pn in T then q˜n σ→ p˜n
in T ′. There are six possibilities:
• qn = y is a Y state and pn = z is a Z state, Def. 12 (i).
Let y=(xd ,x f ) and σ ∈Σ. Based on inductive assumption
there exists y˜ = (x˜d , x˜ f ) and y˜0
ω→ y˜ in T ′. From y σ→ z in
T and based on Def. 12 it holds that x f
σ→ in det(G)
and I(z) = y and E(z) = σ . Since det(G) ≈ Hb it holds
that there exists x˜ f
σ→ in Hb, where x˜ f ≈ x f . This means
y˜ σ→ z˜ in T ′, where y˜ = (x˜d , x˜ f ) and I(z˜) = (x˜d , x˜ f ) and
E(z˜) = σ .
• qn = z is a Z state and pn = z′ is a Z state, Def. 12 (ii).
Let z = ((xd ,x f ),eo) and σ ∈ Θ. Then based on Def. 12
it holds that σ ∈ Σ and I(z′) = (x′d ,x f ) and xd
σ→ x′d in
detd(G) and E(z′) = eo. Since detd(G)≈ Hobd and from
xd
σ→ x′d in detd(G) it follows that x˜d
σ→ x˜′d in Hobd , where
x˜d ≈ xd and x˜′d ≈ x′d , and based on the inductive assump-
tion it follows that there exists z˜= ((x˜d , x˜ f ),eo) such that
y˜0 ω→ z˜ in T ′. Thus, z˜ σ→ z˜′ in T ′, where z˜ = ((x˜d , x˜ f ),eo)
and σ ∈ Σ and I(z˜′) = (x˜′d , x˜ f ) and x˜d
σ→ x˜′d in Hobd and
E(z˜′) = eo.
• q˜n
σ→ p˜n is the ε insertion function and qn = z is a Z state
and pn =w is a W state, Def. 12 (iii). Let z= ((xd ,x f ),eo)
and σ ∈ Θ. Then based on Def. 12 it holds that σ = ε
and I(w) = I(z) and A(w) = eo and xd
eo→ and x f eo→ in
detd(G) and det(G), respectively. Since det(G)≈Hb and
detd(G)≈Hobd , from x f eo→ in det(G) it follows that x˜ f eo→
in Hb and from xd
eo→ in detd(G) it follows that x˜d eo→
in Hobd . Moreover, based on the inductive assumption it
holds that there exists z˜ = ((x˜d , x˜ f ),eo) such that y˜0
ω→ z˜
in T ′. Thus, z˜ σ→ w˜ in T ′, where based on Def. 12 it holds
that σ = ε and I(w˜) = I(z˜) and A(w˜) = eo and x˜d
eo→ and
x˜ f
eo→ in Hobd and Hb, respectively.
• q˜n
σ→ p˜n is the event erasure transition function and qn = z
is a Z state and pn = w is a W state, Def. 12 (iv). Let
z = ((xd ,x f ),eo) and σ ∈ Θ. Then based on Def. 12 it
holds that σ = eo→ ε and I(w) = I(z) and A(w) = eo→
ε and x f
eo→ in det(G). Since det(G) ≈ Hb from x f eo→
in det(G) it follows that x˜ f
eo→ in Hb. Moreover, based
on the inductive assumption it follows that there exists
z˜ = ((x˜d , x˜ f ),eo) such that y˜0
ω→ z˜ in T ′. Thus, z˜ σ→ w˜ in
T ′, where based on Def. 12 it holds that σ = eo→ ε and
I(w˜) = I(z˜) and A(w˜) = eo→ ε and x˜ f eo→ in Hb.
• qn = w is a W state and pn = y is a Y state and σ ∈ Σ,
Def. 12 (v). Let w= ((xd ,x f ),eo). Then based on Def. 12
it holds that y= (x′d ,x
′
f ) and x f
eo→ x′f in det(G) and xd
eo→
x′d in detd(G). Since det(G) ≈ Hb and detd(G) ≈ Hobd ,
from x f
eo→ x′f in det(G) it follows that x˜ f
eo→ x˜′f in Hb
and from xd
eo→ x′d in detd(G) it follows that x˜d
eo→ x˜′d
in Hobd . Moreover, based on the inductive assumption it
holds that there exists w˜= ((x˜d , x˜ f ),eo) such that y˜0
ω→ w˜
in T ′. Thus, w˜ σ→ y˜ in T ′, where based on Def. 12 it holds
that y˜ = (x˜′d , x˜
′
f ) and x˜ f
eo→ x˜′f in Hb and x˜d
eo→ x˜′d in Hobd .
• qn = w is a W state and pn = y is a Y state and σ ∈ Σ,
Def. 12 (vi). Let w = ((xd ,x f ),eo → ε). Then based on
Def. 12 it holds that y = (xd ,x′f ) and x f
eo→ x′f in det(G).
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Since det(G)≈ Hb and from x f eo→ x′f in det(G) it holds
that x˜ f
eo→ x˜′f in Hb. Moreover, based on the inductive
assumption it holds that there exists w˜=((x˜d , x˜ f ),eo→ ε)
such that y˜0 ω→ w˜ in T ′. Thus, w˜ σ→ y˜ in T ′, where based
on Def. 12 it holds that y˜ = (x˜d , x˜′f ) and x˜ f
eo→ x˜′f in Hb.
(⇐) It must be shown that if q˜n σ→ p˜n in T ′ then qn σ→ pn
in T . The same argument as (⇒) holds. 
Theorem 5 proves that the largest three-player observer
obtained from the abstracted system (using opaque observation
equivalence and opaque bisimulation) has the same set of runs
with that obtained from the original system. This result is
essential for the correctness of Algorithm CA-AES.
Remark 1: The abstractions in the worst case scenario fail
to merge any states. However, as pointed out in the paper the
complexity of the abstraction methods is polynomial, while
the complexity of calculating the observer is exponential in the
number of states. Thus, if the abstraction results in merging
even few states, it can potentially reduce the complexity of
calculating the observer significantly. Therefore, it is worth
applying the abstraction algorithm before calculating the ob-
servers.
Example 2: Consider the nondeterministic system G =
{G1,G2}, shown in Fig. 2, with secret states sets QS1 = {q3}
and QS2 = {s3} where all the events are observable except event
τ . In G1 states q1 and q2 are opaque observation equivalent as
they both have the same secrecy status and equivalent states
can be reached from both, q1
α→ q3 and q2 α→ q3, and q1 τ→ q2
and q2
ε→ q2. Merging q1 and q2 results in the abstracted
automaton G˜1 shown in Fig. 2. Moreover, states s1 and s2 are
also opaque observation equivalent and merging them results
in automaton G˜2 shown Fig. 2. After abstracting the automata,
the system becomes a deterministic system. Moreover, the
observers as of G˜1 and G˜2 are bisimilar to det(G1) and
det(G2), respectively. The same is also true for the desired
observer of G˜1 and G˜2. Fig. 2 shows the largest three-player
observers of G˜1 and G˜2, respectively.
B. Synchronous composition of TPOs
The second strategy used in Algorithm CA-AES to reduce
computation complexity is synchronous composition of indi-
vidual systems. In this work, the main advantage of our com-
positional approach is to build the largest three-player observer
of each component individually, instead of synchronizing
individual components and then building the largest monolithic
three-player observer. Before synchronization, we first transfer
each individual TPO to an automaton using Def. 23. Next,
the individual automata are transformed to a set of interacting
automata based on Def. 24. It is shown in Theorem 8 that
the set of modular three-player observers form a subsystem of
their monolithic counterpart, in the sense that some runs are
omitted after synchronization. Before Theorem 8, Lemmas 6
and 7 establish that synchronization of individual observers
(respectively, desired observers) is isomorphic to the observer
(respectively, desired observers) of the synchronized system.
Definition 23: Let T = 〈QY ,QZ ,QW ,Σ,Σε ,Θ,→yz,→zz
,→zw,→wy,y0〉 be a three-player observer. Automaton
G1
q0
q1
q2
q3
α
αγ
γ
τ
q0
α
γ
{q1,q2}
{q3}
det(G1)
q0
γ
{q1,q2}
detd(G1)
G2
s0
s1
s2
s3
α
β
τ
G˜1
q0
α
γ
q12
q3
G˜2
s0
s12
s3
α
β
T ′1
(q0 ,q0)
(q0 ,q0),γ
(q0 ,q0),
γ → ε
(q0 ,q0),
γ
(q0 ,q12)(q12 ,q12)
(q0 ,q12),α(q12 ,q12),α
(q0 ,q12),
α → ε
(q12 ,q12),
α → ε
(q0 ,q3)(q12 ,q3)
γ
γ → εε
γγ
α α
γ
α → εα → ε
αα
T ′2
(s0 ,s0)
(s0 ,s0),β
(s0 ,s0),
β → ε
(s0 ,s0),
β
(s0 ,s12)(s12 ,s12)
(s0 ,s12),α(s12 ,s12),α
(s0 ,s12),
α → ε
(s12 ,s12),
α → ε
(s0 ,s3)(s12 ,s3)
β
β → εε
ββ
α α
β
α → εα → ε
αα
MT1
εγ
γα
!α!α
!γ
γ → εγ
γγ→ε ,w
α → εα α → εα
αα→ε ,wαα→ε ,w
γγ,w
MT2
!α!α
!β
β → εβ
ββ→ε ,w
α → εα α → εα
αα→ε ,wαα→ε ,w
βα
ββ ,w
εβ
GT1
!α!α
!γ
εγ γ → εγ
γγ→ε ,wγγ,w
γα
α → εαα → εα
αα→ε ,wαα→ε ,w
!β
!β
!β
!β
!β
(q0,q3)
GT2
!α!α
!β
εβ β → εβ
ββ→ε ,wββ ,w
βα
α → εαα → εα
αα→ε ,wαα→ε ,w
!γ
!γ
!γ
!γ
!γ
(s0,s3)
Fig. 2. System G = {G1,G2} and its abstraction {G˜1, G˜2}. The figure
also shows the largest three-player observers T ′1 and T
′
2 of the abstracted
components and their automata transformations, denoted by GT1 and G
T
2 . The
uncontrollable events are marked by (!).
each state of the three-player observer is considered as an
automaton state, Qi = QiY ∪QiZ ∪QiW in Def. 23. Moreover,
the information about the states needs to be considered to
distinguish some transitions in the transformed automaton and
to have a correct synchronization of three-player observers,
since the information about state types (Y , W , Z) is lost in the
transformation. To this end, in the transformed automaton, the
events labeling the transitions from z to z states, from z to w
states and from w to y states, need to have the information of
the predecessor states reflected in them. Thus, the events in the
transformed automaton have the observable event components
of Z states,
⋃
p∈QiZ
ΘiE(p), and the action components ofW states,⋃
p∈QiW
ΣiA(p),w. The initial state of the transformed automaton
is the initial state of the three-player observer and the marked
states are the original Y states.
Example 3: Consider the two three-player observers T ′1
and T ′2 shown in Fig. 2. To transform the three-player
observers T1 and T2 to their monolithic automata, renaming
ρ : {α,β ,γ ,εγ ,γ → εγ ,γγ→ε ,w,γε ,w,γα ,εβ ,β → εβ ,ββ→ε ,w,
βε ,w,βα ,α → εα ,αα→ε ,w} → {α,β ,γ ,ε ,α → ε ,β → ε ,γ →
ε} is introduced. Next, all Y states in T ′1 and T ′2 are considered
as marked. Fig. 2 shows MT1 and M
T
2 , which are the monolithic
transformed automata from T ′1 and T
′
2 , respectively. All the
events that come from transitions defined out of Y states and
W states in T ′1 and T
′
2 are considered as uncontrollable in G
T
1
and GT2 , thus α , β and γ are uncontrollable.
This paper describes the compositional approach for modu-
lar systems. In order to have a correct interaction between the
transformed automata, the transformation of the three-player
observers needs to be done in the modular setting.
Definition 24: Let T = {T1, . . . ,Tn} be a three-player ob-
server system such that Ti = 〈QiY ,QiZ ,QiW ,Σi,Σεi ,Θi,→iyz,→izz
,→izw,→iwy,yi0〉. Let MTi = 〈ΣiMT ,QiM,→iM,Q0M
i
,QmM
i〉 be the
monolithic transformed deterministic automaton of Ti, based
on Def. 23. The transformed automaton system of T is
G T = {GT1 , · · · ,GTn }, where GTi = 〈ΣiGT ,Qi,→i,Q0i ,Qmi 〉 and
(i) ΣGTi =Σ
i
MT ∪ [
⋃
α∈(Σ j\Σi); j 6=i
((Σi∩Σ j)α ∪(Σi∩Σ j)α ,w∪(Σi∩
Σ j)α→ε ,w)]
(ii) Qi = QiM ,
(iii) →iM
⋃{(p,α, p) | p ∈ Qiy and α ∈ ⋃
j 6=i
(Σ j \Σi)}
(iv) Q0i = Q
0
M
i,
(v) Qmi = Q
m
M
i.
Since some shared events in the transformed automaton be-
come local after incorporating the extra state information, they
need to be added in the alphabet of the transformed automa-
ton,
⋃
α∈(Σ j\Σi); j 6=i
((Σi∩Σ j)α ∪ (Σi∩Σ j)α ,w∪ (Σi∩Σ j)α→ε ,w) in
Def. 24. Moreover, the events not defined from Y states of
certain TPO T but defined from Y states of some other TPO
T ′ are added as self-loops at the corresponding states in the
transformed automaton of T , {(p,α, p) | p ∈ Qiy and α ∈⋃
j 6=i
(Σ j \Σi)}. To create a map between the events of a TPO
and its transformed automaton, renaming of events is nec-
essary. Note, when the transformation of a single automaton
9
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MT = 〈ΣMT ,Q,→,Q0,Qm〉 is the monolithic transformed
deterministic automaton of T where,
(i) ΣMT = Σ∪ [
⋃
p∈QZ
ΘE(p)]∪ [
⋃
p∈QW
ΣA(p),w]
(ii) Q = QY ∪QZ ∪QW ,
(iii) →= {(p,α,q) | p ∈ Qy∧ p α→yz q}⋃{(p,σ ,q) | p ∈ QZ ∧
σ = αE(p) ∧ p α→zz,zw1,zw2 q}
⋃{(p,σ ,q) | p ∈ QW ∧σ =
αA(p),w∧ p α→wy1,wy2 q}
(iv) Q0 = y0,
(v) Qm = QY .
The events labeling outgoing transitions mapped from original
Y states in T , i.e., {(p,α,q) | p ∈Qy∧ p α→yz q} and outgoing
transitions mapped from original W states in T , {(p,σ ,q) |
p ∈ QW ∧σ = αA(p),w ∧ p α→wy1,wy2 q} are considered as un-
controllable while the other events are controllable.
In Def. 23, Σα represents that α is added to all the events
of Σ. To transform a three-player observer to an automaton,
each state of the three-player observer is considered as an
automaton state, Qi = QiY ∪QiZ ∪QiW in Def. 23. Moreover,
the information about the states needs to be considered to
distinguish some transitions in the transformed automaton and
to have a correct synchronization of three-player observers,
since the information about state types (Y , W , Z) is lost in the
transformation. To this end, in the transformed automaton, the
events labeling the transitions from z to z states, from z to w
states and from w to y states, need to have the information of
the predecessor states reflected in them. Thus, the events in the
transformed automaton have the observable event components
of Z states,
⋃
p∈QiZ
ΘiE(p), and the action components of W states,⋃
p∈QiW
ΣiA(p),w. The initial state of the transformed automaton
is the initial state of the three-player observer and the marked
states are the original Y states.
Example 3: Consider the two three-player observers T ′1
and T ′2 shown in Fig. 2. To transform the three-player
observers T1 and T2 to their monolithic automata, renaming
ρ : {α,β ,γ,εγ ,γ → εγ ,γγ→ε,w,γε,w,γα ,εβ ,β → εβ ,ββ→ε,w,
βε,w,βα ,α → εα ,αα→ε,w} → {α,β ,γ,ε,α → ε,β → ε,γ →
ε} is introduced. Next, all Y states in T ′1 and T ′2 are considered
as marked. Fig. 2 shows MT1 and M
T
2 , which are the monolithic
transformed automata from T ′1 and T
′
2 , respectively. All the
events that come from transitions defined out of Y states and
W states in T ′1 and T
′
2 are considered as uncontrollable in G
T
1
and GT2 , thus α , β and γ are uncontrollable.
This paper describes the compositional approach for modu-
lar systems. In order to have a correct interaction between the
transformed automata, the transformation of the three-player
observers needs to be done in the modular setting.
Definition 24: Let T = {T1, . . . ,Tn} be a three-player ob-
server system such that Ti = 〈QiY ,QiZ ,QiW ,Σi,Σεi ,Θi,→iyz,→izz
,→izw,→iwy,yi0〉. Let MTi = 〈ΣiMT ,QiM,→iM,Q0M
i
,QmM
i〉 be the
monolithic transformed deterministic automaton of Ti, based
on Def. 23. The transformed automaton system of T is
G T = {GT1 , · · · ,GTn }, where GTi = 〈ΣiGT ,Qi,→i,Q0i ,Qmi 〉 and
(i) ΣGTi =Σ
i
MT ∪ [
⋃
α∈(Σ j\Σi); j 6=i
((Σi∩Σ j)α ∪(Σi∩Σ j)α,w∪(Σi∩
Σ j)α→ε,w)]
TABLE I
THE TABLE SHOWS THE LINK BETWEEN THE EVENTS OF A TPO, ITS
TRANSFORMED AUTOMATON AND THE CORRESPONDING RENAMING.
TPO T Automaton GT Renaming ρ
y α→yz z y α→ z ρ(α) = α
z α→zz z′, E(z) = eo z αeo−−→ z′ ρ(αeo ) = α
z α→zw1 w, E(z) = eo z αeo−−→ w ρ(αeo ) = α
z α→zw2 w, E(z) = eo z αeo−−→ w ρ(αeo ) = α
w α→wy1 y, A(w) = eo w
αeo ,w−−−→ y ρ(αeo,w) = α
w α→wy2 y, A(w) = eo→ ε w
αeo→ε,w−−−−−→ y ρ(αeo→ε,w) = α
(ii) Qi = QiM ,
(iii) →iM
⋃{(p,α, p) | p ∈ Qiy and α ∈ ⋃
j 6=i
(Σ j \Σi)}
(iv) Q0i = Q
0
M
i,
(v) Qmi = Q
m
M
i.
Since some shared events in the transformed automaton be-
come local after incorporating the extra state information, they
need to be added in the alphabet of the transformed automa-
ton,
⋃
α∈(Σ j\Σi); j 6=i
((Σi∩Σ j)α ∪ (Σi∩Σ j)α,w∪ (Σi∩Σ j)α→ε,w) in
Def. 24. Moreover, the events not defined from Y states of
certain TPO T but defined from Y states of some other TPO
T ′ are added as self-loops at the corresponding states in the
transformed automaton of T , {(p,α, p) | p ∈ Qiy and α ∈⋃
j 6=i
(Σ j \Σi)}. To create a map between the events of a TPO
and its transformed automaton, renaming of events is nec-
essary. Note, when the transformation of a single automaton
is considered Def. 23 and Def. 24 produce the same results.
Thus, in the following wherever a transformed automaton is
discussed we refer to Def. 24.
Renaming ρ simply removes the extra information from the
events of the transformed automaton and maps them back to
the original events in the TPO. To be more specific, ρ is
a map such that ρ(ασ ) = α and ρ(α) = α . Table I shows
how the events in a transformed automaton are linked to the
original events of a TPO, while the third column shows how
renaming works. Specifically, in the case where events label
→yz transitions, renaming does not change events names.
Example 4: Consider the abstracted system G˜ = {G˜1, G˜2},
shown in Fig. 2. The sets of secret states are Q˜S1 = {q3},
Q˜S2 = {s3} where all the events are observable. T ′1 and T ′2 are
the largest three-player observers of G˜1, G˜2, respectively. In
Example 3 the monolithic transformed automata of T ′1 and T
′
2
were generated. The three-player observer system {T ′1 ,T ′2} is
transformed to automata system G = {GT1 ,GT2 }, shown Fig. 2,
by adding self-loops at the marked states. Event β is not in
the alphabet of T ′1 so it appears as a self-loop at all marked
states in GT1 , which correspond to Y states in T
′
1 . Similarly, γ
is added as a self-loop at marked states in GT2 since γ is not
in the alphabet of T ′2 .
In the following, Theorem 8 proves that if the synchroniza-
tion of transformed individual three-player observers contains
a transition, then the largest monolithic three-player observer
w.r.t. the synchronized system also contains an equivalent
transition. However, the inverse is not necessarily true as there
are some behaviors in the monolithic three-player observer
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that are omitted in the modular structure. Before Theorem 8,
Lemma 6 [38] and Lemma 7 establish that the modular ob-
server and desired observer are isomorphic to their monolithic
counterparts.
Lemma 6: [38] Let G1 = 〈Σ1,Q1,→1,Q01〉 and G2 =
〈Σ2,Q2,→2,Q02〉 be two nondeterministic automata. Then
det(G1 ‖G2) is isomorphic to det(G1)‖det(G2).
Lemma 7: Let G1 = 〈Q1,Σ1,→1,Q01〉 and G2 = 〈Q2,Σ2,→2
,Q02〉 be two nondeterministic automata with sets of secret
states QS1 and Q
S
2, respectively. Then detd(G1) ‖ detd(G2) is
isomorphic to detd(G1 ‖G2).
Proof: From det(G1 ‖G2) is isomorphic to det(G1)‖det(G2)
it follows that det(G1 ‖G2) s→ X if and only if det(G1) ‖
det(G2)
s→ (X1,X2) and (x1,x2) ∈ X if and only if (x1,x2) ∈
X1×X2. Now we need to show that X 6∈ Xobsd if and only if
(X1,X2) 6∈ X1,obsd×X2,obsd .
First assume X 6∈ Xobsd , which means X ⊆ QS. This further
means that for all (x1,x2)∈X , either x1 ∈QS1 or x2 ∈QS2, which
implies either X1 6∈ X1,obsd or X2 6∈ X2,obsd . Thus, (X1,X2) 6∈
X1,obsd×X2,obsd .
Now assume (X1,X2) 6∈ X1,obsd×X2,obsd . This means either
X1 6∈ X1,obsd or X2 6∈ X2,obsd , which implies either X1 ⊂ QS1 or
X2 ⊂ QS2. Hence for all (x1,x2) ∈ (X1,X2) = X either x1 ∈ QS1
or x2 ∈ QS2, which implies X ⊆ QS. Thus, X 6∈ Xobsd . 
Theorem 8: Let G1 = 〈Q1,Σ1,→1,Q01〉 and
G2 = 〈Q2,Σ2,→2,Q02〉 be two nondeterministic automata
with sets of secret states QS1 and Q
S
2, respectively. Let
T1 = 〈Q1Y ,Q1Z ,Q1W ,Σ1,Σε1,Θ1,→1yz,→1zz,→1zw,→1wy,y10〉 and
T2 = 〈Q2Y ,Q2Z ,Q2W ,Σ2,Σε2,Θ2,→2yz,→2zz,→2zw,→2wy,y20〉
be the largest three-player observers w.r.t. G1 and
G2, respectively. Let GT1 = 〈ΣGT1 ,Q1,→
1,Q01,Q
m
1 〉 and
GT2 = 〈ΣGT2 ,Q2,→
2,Q02,Q
m
2 〉 be the transformed automata
of T1 and T2, respectively. Let T be the largest
monolithic three-player observer w.r.t. G1||G2. Then let
ρ : (ΣGT1 ∪ ΣGT2 ) → (Σ1 ∪ Σ
ε
1 ∪ Θ1) ∪ (Σ2 ∪ Σε2 ∪ Θ2) be a
renaming. We have [GT1 ‖GT2 s→ (q1,q2)]⇒ [T
ρ(s)−−→ q].
Proof: We need to show that a transition is defined in GT1 ‖GT2
if the equivalent transition is defined in T . It is shown by
induction on n≥ 0 that (y01,y02)
s→ (qn1,qn2) in GT1 ‖GT2 implies
y0T
ρ(s)−−→ qT in T .
Let GT1 ‖GT2 s→ (q1,q2).
Base case: n = 0. Let (y01,y
0
2) be the initial state of
G1 ‖G2, i.e., y01 (respectively y02) is the initial state of T1
(respectively T2). From Def. 12, y01 = (X
0
1,obsd ,X
0
1,obs) and
y02 = (X
0
2,obsd ,X
0
2,obs), where X
0
i,obs and X
0
i,obsd are the ini-
tial state of det(Gi) and detd(Gi) for i ∈ {1,2}, respec-
tively. From Lemmas 6 and 7, det(G1 ‖G2) and detd(G1 ‖
G2) are isomorphic to det(G1) ‖ det(G2) and detd(G1) ‖
detd(G2), which implies (X01,obs,X
0
2,obs) is the initial state
of det(G1) ‖ det(G2) and detd(G1) ‖ detd(G2). Thus y0T =
((X01,obsd ,X
0
2,obsd),(X
0
1,obs,X
0
2,obs)) is the initial state of T .
Inductive step: Assume the claim holds for some 0 ≤ n,
which means if (y01,y
0
2) = (q
0
1,q
0
2)
σ0...σn−1−−−−−→ (qn1,qn2) in GT1 ‖GT2
then y0
ρ(σ0...σn−1)−−−−−−−→ qn in T . Now we need to show that if
(q1,q2) = (qn1,q
n
2)
σn→ (p1, p2) in GT1 ‖GT2 then q = qn
ρ(σn)−−−→ p
in T . From (q1,q2) = (qn1,q
n
2)
σn→ (p1, p2) in GT1 ‖GT2 and based
on Def. 2 it holds that qi
σn→ pi in GTi for i ∈ {1,2}, which
means qi
σn→ pi in Ti for i∈ {1,2}. Consider the following four
cases for all the possible transitions:
• if ρ(σn) = σn then based on Def. 24 it holds that qi
σn→ pi
is a yz transition in the original Ti such that E(pi) =
σn and I(pi) = qi if σn ∈ Σi and qi = pi otherwise for
i ∈ {1,2}. Let qi = (xi,d ,xi, f ) for i ∈ {1,2}. Based on
Def. 12 this means xi, f
σn→ in det(Gi) if σn ∈Σi. Moreover,
based on the inductive assumption there exists y=(xd ,x f )
such that y0T
ω→ y in T , which implies det(G1 ‖G2) Pe(ω)−−−→
x f . Since based on Lemma 6 det(G1 ‖G2) and det(G1)‖
det(G2) are isomorphic it holds det(G1)‖det(G2) Pe(ω)−−−→
and string Pe(ω) reaches (x1, f ,x2, f ) in det(G1)‖det(G2).
Thus, based on xi, f
σn→ in det(Gi) it can be deduced that
(x1, f ,x2, f )
σn→ in det(G1‖G2), it also implies (x1, f ,x2, f ) σn→
in det(G1 ‖G2) by Lemma 6. This means qnT = qT
σn→ pT
is a yz transition in T .
• if ρ(σn) = α and σn = αeo . Then based on Def. 24
there are three possibilities for qi
ρ(σn)−−−→ pi in Ti: it is
a zz transition or a zw1 transition or a zw2 transition and
eo = E(qi). Now consider the following cases:
1) αeo ∈ ΣGT1 \ΣGT2 . This means q1
αeo→ p1 in GT1 , which
implies q1
σn→ p1 in T1. From σneo 6∈ ΣGT2 and def. 24
it follows that σn 6∈ Σ2, which implies q2 = p2.
Consider the following three cases: If q1
σn→ p1 in
T1 is a zz transition, then based on Def. 12 it holds
that x1,d
σn→ x′1,d in detd(G1). If q1
σn→ p1 in T1 is
a zw1 transition, then based on Def. 12 it holds
that x1,d
σn→ in detd(G1) and x1, f σn→ in det(G1).
If q1
σn→ p1 in T1 is a zw2 transition, then based
on Def. 12 it holds that x1, f
σn→ in det(G1). In all
the three cases based on Lemmas 6 and 7, where
they show detd(G1 ‖ G2) and detd(G1) ‖ detd(G2)
are isomorphic, it holds that (x1,d ,x2,d)
σn→ (x′1,d ,x2,d)
in detd(G1 ‖G2) and (x1, f ,x2, f ) σn→ in det(G1 ‖G2).
These mean qn = q σn→ p in T is a zz transition if
q1
σn→ p1 in T1 is a zz transition, qn = q σn→ p is a zw1
transition in T if q1
σn→ p1 is a zw1 transition in T1
and qnT = qT
σn→ pT is a zw2 transition in T if q1 σn→ p1
is a zw2 transition in T1.
2) σneo ∈ ΣGT1 ∩ΣGT2 . This means qi
σneo−−→ pi in GTi for
i ∈ {1,2}, which implies qi σn→ pi in Ti for i ∈ {1,2}.
Again there are three cases: If qi
σn→ pi in Ti for
i = 1,2 is a zz transition. Then based on Def. 12
it holds that xi,d
σn→ x′i,d in detd(Gi) for i = 1,2. If
qi
σn→ pi in Ti is a zw1 transition for i ∈ {1,2}. Then
based on Def. 12 it holds that xi,d
σn→ in detd(Gi) and
xi, f
σn→ in det(Gi) for i = 1,2. If qi σn→ pi in Ti is a
zw2 transition for i = 1,2. Then based on Def. 12
it holds that xi, f
σn→ in det(Gi) for i = 1,2. In all
the three cases based on Lemmas 6 and 7 where
they show detd(G1 ‖ G2) and detd(G1) ‖ detd(G2)
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are isomorphic, it holds that (x1,d ,x2,d)
σn→ (x′1,d ,x′2,d)
in detd(G1 ‖G2) and (x1, f ,x2, f ) σn→ in det(G1 ‖G2).
These mean qnT = qT
σn→ pT in T is a zz transition if
qi
σn→ pi in Ti is a zz transition, qnT = qT
σn→ pT is a
zw1 transition in T if qi
σn→ pi is a zw1 transition in Ti
and qnT = qT
σn→ pT is a zw2 transition in T if qi σn→ pi
is a zw2 transition in Ti for i ∈ {1,2}.
3) σneo ∈ ΣGT2 \ΣGT1 . The same argument as case 1.
• if ρ−1(σn) = σneo,w then based on Def. 24 there are again
three cases:
1) σneo,w ∈ ΣGT1 \ΣGT2 . This means q1
σneo ,w−−−→ p1 in GT1 .
From σneo,w 6∈ΣGT2 and def. 24 it follows that σn 6∈Σ2,
which implies q2 = p2. From ρ−1(σn) = σneo,w it
holds that p1
σn→ q1 in T1 is a wy1 transition. This
means x1,d
σn→ x′1,d in detd(G1) and x1, f
σn→ x′1, f in
det(G1). Based on Lemmas 6 and 7, where they
show detd(G1 ‖ G2) and detd(G1) ‖ detd(G2) are
isomorphic, it holds that (x1,d ,x2,d)
σn→ (x′1,d ,x2,d)
in detd(G1 ‖ G2) and (x1, f ,x2, f ) σn→ (x′1, f ,x2, f ) in
det(G1 ‖G2). This means qnT = qT
σn→ pT is a wy1
transition in T .
2) σneo,w ∈ ΣGT1 ∩ΣGT2 . Then it follows that qi
σneo ,w−−−→ pi
in GTi for i ∈ {1,2}. This means qi σ→ pi in Ti is a
wy1 transition, which implies xi,d
σn→ x′i,d in detd(Gi)
and xi, f
σn→ x′i, f in det(Gi) for i ∈ {1,2}. Based on
Lemmas 6 and 7, where they show detd(G1 ‖G2)
and detd(G1) ‖ detd(G2) are isomorphic, it holds
that (x1,d ,x2,d)
σn→ (x′1,d ,x′2,d) in detd(G1 ‖G2) and
(x1, f ,x2, f )
σn→ (x′1, f ,x′2, f ) in det(G1 ‖G2). This means
qnT = qT
σn→ pT is a wy1 transition in T .
3) σneo,w ∈ ΣGT2 \ΣGT1 . The same argument as case 1.
• if ρ−1(σn) = σneo→ε,w then the same argument as above,
ρ−1(σn) = σneo,w, holds. 
Theorem 8 shows that synchronization of individual trans-
formed three-player observers is a subsystem of the largest
monolithic three-player observer. Specifically, if there is a
string s in GT1 ‖GT2 , then there always exists a corresponding
path ρ(s) in T . The synchronized automaton form TPOs may
not always be equal to the monolithic TPO since some →zz
transitions may not appear in the synchronized system. This
happens when a state in the synchronization of TPOs is a
combination of an original Z and an original Y state from
individual TPOs, while the observable event component of
the original Z state is a local event. However, as there is no
difference between local and shared events in the monolithic
approach of obtaining TPOs, the largest monolithic TPO
contains all possible transitions of edit decisions. The proof
of Theorem 8 also illustrates that for every state in the largest
monolithic TPO, there exists a corresponding state in the
synchronized individual TPOs in automaton form.
Remark 2: Although the statement of Theorem 8 concen-
trates on the case of two individual systems, the result can be
generalized to more than two individual systems. 
Remark 3: Notice that Theorem 8 illustrates that some tran-
sitions are “missing” in the synchronized automaton compared
with the largest monolithic three-player observer T . It further
implies that more transitions will be missing if we synchronize
more individual TPOs (in automaton form). Actually, we may
locate those missing transitions and add them back to the
synchronized automaton ‖ni=1GTi .
Specifically, consider states (q1,q2, · · · ,qn) and
(q′1,q
′
2, · · · ,q′n) in ‖ni=1GTi such that qi,q′i ∈ QiY ∪ QiZ for
all i, i.e., every component in those states is either a Y
state or a Z state from an individual transformed automaton.
Then we add transition (q1,q2, · · · ,qn) σ−→ (q′1,q′2, · · · ,q′n) if
there exists a set of indexes I ∈ 2{1,2,···n}, such that for all
i ∈ I, qi = (xi,d ,xi, f ),q′i = (x′i,d ,xi, f ) ∈ QiY and xi,d
σ−→ x′i,d in
detd(Gi); while for all i /∈ I, qi = q′i. Intuitively, the added
transition implies that event σ may be inserted in the largest
monolithic TPO w.r.t. ‖ni=1Gi. However, due to the fact that
there are no transitions defined from a Y state to another Y
state in TPOs, those transitions are missing in ‖ni=1GTi , which
implies the synchronized system ‖ni=1GTi may only contain a
subset of edit decisions in the largest monolithic TPO.
However, the above mentioned operation may not be pre-
ferred in practice since it involves explicitly synchronizing
individual TPOs in their automaton form. This is usually not
feasible in modular approaches and should be avoided in our
Algorithm CA-AES as well. 
Finally, the results of this section are formally recapped
in Theorem 9, which illustrates that the synchronization of
transformed (automaton form) three-player observers w.r.t. in-
dividual abstracted systems contain a subset of the transitions
of the largest monolithic three-player observer. The proof
follows directly from Theorem 8 and Theorem 5.
Theorem 9: Let G1 and G2 be two nondeterministic au-
tomaton with sets of secret states QSi ⊆ Qi and sets of non-
secret states QNSi = Q \ QSi for i = 1,2. Let det(Gi) and
detd(Gi) be the observer and the desired observer of Gi,
respectively. Let ∼o be an opaque observation equivalence
on Gi such that G˜i ∼o Gi for i = 1,2. Let Hi,ob ≈o det(G˜i)
and Hi,b ≈ det(G˜i) for i ∈ {1,2}, where ≈o and ≈ are
opaque bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. Let T
be the largest three-player observer w.r.t. G1 ‖ G2 and let
T ′i = 〈QiY ,QiZ ,QiW ,Σi,Σεi ,Θi,→iyz,→izz,→izw,→iwy,yi0〉 be the
largest three-player observer w.r.t. detd(Hi,ob) and Hi,b for
i ∈ {1,2}. Let GTi = 〈ΣGTi ,Qi,→
i,Q0i ,Q
m
i 〉 for i = 1,2 be
the transformed automata of T ′i and let ρ : (ΣGT1 ∪ ΣGT2 )→
(Σ1 ∪ Σε1 ∪ Θ1) ∪ (Σ2 ∪ Σε2 ∪ Θ2) be a renaming. We have
[GT1 ‖GT2 s→ (q1,q2)] τ⇒ [T
ρ(s)−−→ q].
Example 5: Consider the system G = {G1,G2} shown in
Fig. 2. In the first step of the compositional approach the
system is abstracted by applying opaque observation equiv-
alence, see Example 2. The abstracted system G˜ = {G˜1, G˜2}
is shown in Fig. 2. Next, the three player observer of individual
components are built. As explained in Example 4 the three-
player observers of G˜1 and G˜2 are T ′1 and T
′
2 , respectively,
shown in Fig. 2. Moreover, Fig. 2 also shows GT1 and
GT2 , the transformed automata of T
′
1 and T
′
2 , respectively.
The largest monolithic three-player observer w.r.t G1 ‖ G2
is denoted by T and is shown in Fig. 3. In this particular
12
T(A,A) (A,A),γ
(A,A),
γ → ε
(A,A), γ
(A,C)(C,C)
(C,C),β (A,C),β
(C,C), β (C,C),
β → ε (A,C), β
(A,C),
β → ε
(A,A),β
(A,A),
β → ε
(A,A), β
(A,B)(B,B)
(B,B),γ (A,B),γ
(B,B), γ (B,B),γ → ε (A,B), γ (A,B),γ → ε
(D,D)
(B,D)
(C,D)
(A,D)
(D,D),α
(B,D),α
(C,D),α
(A,D),α
(D,D),
α → ε (B,D),
α → ε
(C,D),
α → ε (A,D),
α → ε
(D,E)
(B,E)
(C,E)
(A,E)
γβ
γ → εεβ → εε
γγβ
β
γ γ β β
β γ
ε γ → ε ε γ → ε ε β → ε ε β → ε
γ γ
γ γ β
β β
β
α
α
α
α
α → ε
α → ε α → ε α → ε
α
α
α
α
γβγ
β
Fig. 3. The monolithic largest three-player observer w.r.t. to G1 ‖G2 (also same as that w.r.t. G˜1 ‖ G˜2 in this particular case) in Example 5.
example, it can be verified that the original and abstracted
three-player observers are identical (this need not be true in
general); therefore, T in Fig. 3 also represents the largest
three-player observer w.r.t. G˜1 ‖ G˜2. In T , we have states:
A = {(q0,s0)}, B = {(q0,s1),(q0,s2)}, C = {(q1,s0),(q2,s0)},
D = {(q1,s1),(q2,s1),(q2,s2),(q1,s2)} and E = {(q3,s3)}.
After synchronizing GT1 with G
T
2 , we find that there are
some transitions in Fig. 3, which do not correspond to any
transition in GT1 ‖GT2 . For example, no transition in GT1 ‖GT2
corresponds to the zz transition of β from state (A,B,γ) to
(B,B,γ) in Fig. 3.
V. FROM ALL EDIT STRUCTURE CALCULATION
TO SUPERVISOR SYNTHESIS
So far we have shown that in our compositional and
abstraction-based approach, individual components can be
abstracted and each largest three-player observer w.r.t. an
abstracted component can be calculated individually. Then we
transfer those three-player observers (TPOs) to their automaton
forms. After that, we have also shown in Theorem 9 that
the synchronization of the transformed three-player observers
results in a subsystem of the largest monolithic three-player
observer up to the renaming of events.
Recall that the All Edit Structure (AES) is obtained after
pruning deadlocking states from the largest TPO. Here the
modular structure of the transformed TPO is kept and the
calculation of a “Modular Edit Structure” can be done by
mapping this problem to a modular nonblocking supervisory
control problem under full observation.
As was discussed at the end of Section II-C, we pursue
an approach to convert the pruning process (from the largest
TPO to the AES) to a supervisory control problem. In this
setting, the plant is a collection of automata transformed
from individual largest TPOs obtained at the end of step (iv)
of Algorithm CA-AES. The specification is the automaton
form of the edit constraint. The constraint of having up to
n+1 consecutive erasures can be modeled by a specification
automaton with n states where transitions are labeled by the
decision events and all states are marked except the last
state, which is a blocking state. After n consecutive event
erasures, the next transition of event erasure α → εα leads
the specification forward to a blocking state. If the next event
is a non-erasure event, it leads the specification back to the
initial state, thus resetting the sequence of erasures. Since
we have a modular representation of the plant, we are able
to leverage computationally efficient compositional techniques
for modular nonblocking supervisory control problems.
Definition 25: Let T = {T1, . . . ,Tn} be a three-player ob-
server system where Ti = 〈QiY ,QiZ ,QiW ,Σi,Σεi ,Θi,→iyz,→izz
,→izw,→iwy,yi0〉 and let Φ be the edit constraint on T such
that there are not n + 1 consecutive event erasures. Then
K = 〈ΣK ,QK ,→K ,Q0K ,QKm〉 is the automaton form of Φ where,
• QK = {x1, . . . ,xn}
• →K= ⋃1≤i≤n−1{(xi,α → εα ,xi+1) | p α→ε−−−→zw2
q and E(p) = α} ∪ ⋃1≤i≤n−2{(xi+1,εα ,x1) | p ε→zw1
q and E(p) = α} ∪ ⋃1≤i≤n−2{(xi+1,ασ ,x1) | p α→zz
q and E(p) = σ} ∪{(x1,εα ,x1) | p ε→zw1 q and E(p) =
α}∪{(x1,ασ ,x1) | p α→zz q and E(p) = σ},
• Q0K = x1
• QKm = {x1, . . . ,xn−1}
Example 6: Consider the transformed system G T =
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the synchronization of the transformed three-player observers
results in a subsystem of the largest monolithic three-player
observer up to the renaming of events.
Recall that the All Edit Structure (AES) is obtained after
pruning deadlocking states from the largest TPO. Here the
modular structure of the transformed TPO is kept and the
calculation of a “Modular Edit Structure” can be done by
mapping this problem to a modular nonblocking supervisory
control problem under full observation.
As was discussed at the end of Section II-C, we pursue
an approach to convert the pruning process (from the largest
TPO to the AES) to a supervisory control problem. In this
setting, the plant is a collection of automata transformed
from individual largest TPOs obtained at the end of step (iv)
of Algorithm CA-AES. The specification is the automaton
form of the edit constraint. The constraint of having up to
n+1 consecutive erasures can be modeled by a specification
automaton with n states where transitions are labeled by the
decision events and all states are marked except the last
state, which is a blocking state. After n consecutive event
erasures, the next transition of event erasure α → εα leads
the specification forward to a blocking state. If the next event
is a non-erasure event, it leads the specification back to the
initial state, thus resetting the sequence of erasures. Since
we have a modular representation of the plant, we are able
to leverage computationally efficient compositional techniques
for modular nonblocking supervisory control problems.
Definition 25: Let T = {T1, . . . ,Tn} be a three-player ob-
server system where Ti = 〈QiY ,QiZ ,QiW ,Σi,Σεi ,Θi,→iyz,→izz
,→izw,→iwy,yi0〉 and let Φ be the edit constraint on T such
that there are not n+ 1 consecutive event erasures. Then
K = 〈ΣK ,QK ,→K ,Q0K ,QKm〉 is the automaton form of Φ where,
• QK = {x1, . . . ,xn}
• →K= ⋃1≤i≤n−1{(xi,α → εα ,xi+1) | p α→ε−−−→zw2
q and E(p) = α} ∪ ⋃1≤i≤n−2{(xi+1,εα ,x1) | p ε→zw1
q and E(p) = α} ∪ ⋃1≤i≤n−2{(xi+1,ασ ,x1) | p α→zz
q and E(p) = σ} ∪{(x1,εα ,x1) | p ε→zw1 q and E(p) =
α}∪{(x1,ασ ,x1) | p α→zz q and E(p) = σ},
• Q0K = x1
• QKm = {x1, . . . ,xn−1}
Example 6: Consider the transformed system G T =
{GT1 ,GT2 } shown in Fig. 2. Assume the constraint Φ only
allows one erasure. The specification automaton of this con-
straint is shown in Fig. 4 as K. Automaton K has three states.
As there is no constraint on event insertion, the events related
with event insertion just form self-loops at the initial state of
K. On the other hand, by executing α→ εα , β → εβ or γ→ εγ
the specification transits from x1 to x2. Next, at x2 if the edit
decision is to certain events, then the system goes back to the
initial state x1, thus allowing more event erasures since there
are no consecutive erasures. However, if another event erasure
occurs from x2, the system goes to the blocking state x3.
The following theorem establishes that the three-player
observer of the system under constraint Φ and the transformed
system synchronized with the specification K have the same
runs up to a renaming of the events.
Theorem 10: Let G = 〈Σ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterministic
K
x1
x2
x3
εβ
εβ
εγ
εγ
γα
γα
βα
βα β → εβ
β → εβ
α → εα
α → εα
γ → εγ
γ → εγ
S
x1
x2
εβ
εβ
εγ
εγ
γα
γα
βα
βα β → εβα → εαγ → εγ
SP
!α
εβ
α → εα
αα→ε ,w
!γ !βγ → εγ γγ→ε ,w
ββ ,wγα
Fig. 4. Automaton K is the automaton form of the constraint Φ in Example 6,
S and SP ares the supervisor and the selected path in Example 7.
automaton with the set of secret states QS ⊆ Q. Let T ′ =
〈Q′Y ,Q′Z ,Q′W ,Σ,Σε ,Θ,→′yz,→′zz,→′zw,→′wy,y′0〉 be the largest
three-player observer of G under the edit constraint Φ
which prohibits n+ 1 consecutive event erasures. Let T =
〈QY ,QZ ,QW ,Σ,Σε ,Θ,→yz,→zz,→zw,→wy,y0〉 be the largest
three-player observer w.r.t. G when no constraint is considered
and let GT = 〈ΣGT ,Q,→,Q0〉 be the automaton transformation
of T . Let K be the specification automaton of Φ. Then
GT ‖K s→ if and only if T ′ ρ(s)−−→.
Proof: Clearly T ′ ⊑ T and ΣK ⊆ ΣGT . First let GT ‖K s→
(qG,qK)
σ→ (pG, pK), let PK : ΣGT → ΣK and let PE : ΣGT →⋃
σ∈Σ{σ → εσ ∈ ΣK} be a map that removes all the events
except event erasures from ΣK . From GT ‖K s→ (qG,qK) σ→
(pG, pK) and ΣK ⊆ ΣGT and Def. 2, it holds that GT s→ qG σ→
pG and K
PK(s)−−−→ qK PK(σ)−−−→ pK . Now consider three cases:
1) qK = xi, pK = xi+1 and pK ,qK ∈ QKm. Then |PE(s)| < n.
This implies σ is an erasure event but there are not n
consecutive erasures in s, so T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT ρ(σ)−−−→ pT .
2) qK = xi, pK = xi+1, qK ∈QKm but pK 6∈QKm. Then |PE(s)|=
n and K
PK(s)−−−→ qK σ→ pK , which implies GT ‖K sσ→ (pG, pK)
and (pG, pK) is a blocking state. This further indicates
there are n consecutive erasures in s,so T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT 6→.
3) qK = xi, pK = x1 and pK ,qK ∈ QKm. This implies σ is a
non-erasure event, so T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT ρ(σ)−−−→ pT .
Now assume T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT . This means T ρ(s)−−→ qT , which
implies GT s→ qT . Consider two cases. 1. |PE(s)| < n. Then
K
PK(s)−−−→ qK , which implies GT ‖K s→ (qG,qK). 2. |PE(s)|= n.
This means T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT 6→ and K PK(s)−−−→ qK 6→, which implies
GT ‖K s→ (qG,qK) 6→. 
The following theorem shows that equivalent states are
removed in solving the supervisory control problem to obtain
an automaton satisfying the edit constraint and in the pruning
process to obtain the AES from the largest TPO.
Theorem 11: Let G = 〈Σ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterministic
automaton with the set of secret states QS ⊆ Q and let Φ be
the edit constraint which prohibits n+1 consecutive event era-
sures. Let T = 〈QY ,QZ ,QW ,Σ,Σε ,Θ,→yz,→zz,→zw,→wy,y0〉
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Fig. 4. Automaton K is the automaton form of the constraint Φ in Example 6,
S and SP ares the supervisor and the selected path in Example 7.
{GT1 ,GT2 } shown in Fig. 2. Assume the constraint Φ only
allows one erasure. The specification automaton of this con-
straint is shown in Fig. 4 as K. Automaton K has three states.
As there is no constraint on event insertion, the events related
with event insertion just form self-loops at the initial state of
K. On the other hand, by executing α→ εα , β → εβ or γ→ εγ
the specification transits from x1 to x2. Next, at x2 if the edit
decision is to certain events, then the system goes back to the
initial state x1, thus allowing more event erasures since there
are no consecutive erasures. However, if another event erasure
occurs from x2, the system goes to the blocking state x3.
The following theorem establishes that the three-player
observer of the system under constraint Φ and the transformed
system synchronized with the specification K have the same
runs up to a renaming of the events.
Theorem 10: Let G = 〈Σ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterministic
automaton with the set of secret states QS ⊆ Q. Let T ′ =
〈Q′Y ,Q′Z ,Q′W ,Σ,Σε ,Θ,→′yz,→′zz,→′zw,→′wy,y′0〉 be the largest
three-player observer of G under the edit constraint Φ
which prohibits n+ 1 consecutive event erasures. Let T =
〈QY ,QZ ,QW ,Σ,Σε ,Θ,→yz,→zz,→zw,→wy,y0〉 be the largest
three-player observer w.r.t. G when no constraint is considered
and let GT = 〈ΣGT ,Q,→,Q0〉 be the automat n transformation
of T . Let K be the specification automaton of Φ. Then
GT ‖K s→ if nd only if T ′ ρ(s)−−→.
Proof: Clearly T ′ v T and ΣK ⊆ ΣGT . First let GT ‖K s→
(qG,qK)
σ→ (pG, pK), let PK : ΣGT → ΣK and let PE : ΣGT →⋃
σ∈Σ{σ → εσ ∈ ΣK} be a map that removes all the events
except event erasures from ΣK . From GT ‖K s→ (qG,qK) σ→
(pG, pK) and ΣK ⊆ ΣGT and Def. 2, it holds that GT s→ qG σ→
pG and K
PK(s)−−−→ qK PK(σ)−−−→ pK . Now consider three cases:
1) qK = xi, pK = xi+1 and pK ,qK ∈ QKm. Then |PE(s)| < n.
This implies σ is an erasure event but there are not n
onsecutive erasures in s, so T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT ρ(σ)−−−→ pT .
2) qK = xi, pK = xi+1, qK ∈QKm but pK 6∈QKm. Then |PE(s)|=
n and K
PK(s)−−−→ qK σ→ pK , which implies GT ‖K sσ→ (pG, pK)
and (pG, pK) is a blocking state. This further indicates
there are n consecutive erasures in s,so T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT 6→.
3) qK = xi, pK = x1 and pK ,qK ∈ QKm. This implies σ is a
non-erasure event, so T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT ρ(σ)−−−→ pT .
Now assume T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT . This means T ρ(s)−−→ qT , which
implies GT s→ qT . Consider two cases. 1. |PE(s)| < n. Then
K
PK(s)−−−→ qK , which implies GT ‖K s→ (qG,qK). 2. |PE(s)|= n.
This means T ′
ρ(s)−−→ qT 6→ and K PK(s)−−−→ qK 6→, which implies
GT ‖K s→ (qG,qK) 6→. 
The following theorem shows that equivalent states are
removed in solving the supervisory control problem to obtain
an automaton satisfying the edit constraint and in the pruning
process to obtain the AES from the largest TPO.
Theorem 11: Let G = 〈Σ,Q,→,Q0〉 be a nondeterministic
automaton with the set of secret states QS ⊆ Q and let Φ be
the edit constraint which prohibits n+1 consecutive event era-
sures. Let T = 〈QY ,QZ ,QW ,Σ,Σε ,Θ,→yz,→zz,→zw,→wy,y0〉
be the largest three-player observer w.r.t. G without consid-
ering the edit constraint and let GT = 〈ΣGT ,Q,→,Q0〉 be the
the transformed automaton of T . Let ρ : ΣGT → (Σ1∪Σε1∪Θ1)
be a renaming and let AES be the All Edit Structure obtained
from T . Let S be the supremal controllable and nonblocking
subautomaton of GT after considering the specification intro-
duced by Φ. Then S
ρ−1(s)−−−−→ q if and only if AES ρ(s)−−→ q.
Proof: The pruning process to obtain the AES and the su-
pervisor synthesis procedure are both iterative, which remove
states at each iteration. We will show by induction that at each
iteration a state is removed in GT by the supervisory control
synthesis procedure if and only if the corresponding state is
removed by the pruning process from T .
Base case: Clearly GT and T have the same transition
relation.
Inductive step: Assume the claim holds for some n > 0.
We let XnG be the state space of G
T at the n-th iteration of
supervisor synthesis process and XnT be the state set of T at the
n-th iteration of pruning process. Then S
ρ−1(s)−−−−→ q⇔ AES ρ(s)−−→
q holds for all q ∈ XnG (q ∈ XnT ). Now we need to show that
Xn+1G and X
n+1
T are also equal. Assume G
T s→ q, which implies
T
ρ(s)−−→ q based on Def. 24.
(⇒) First we show that if q 6∈ Xn+1T , which means q is
removed by the pruning process at the n-th iteration, so q 6∈
Xn+1G . Then q 6∈ Xn+1T if it is a deadlock state or it is a Y
state and there exists eo ∈ Σ such that q eo→ z′, where z′ is a
deadlock Z state. If q is a deadlock state then based on Def. 12
it holds that q is either a W state or a Z state. Thus, consider
the following three case:
• q is a W state. Then 6 ∃eo ∈ Σ such that q eo→. Then based
on Def. 24 it holds that either q 6 eoeo−−→ or q 6 eoeo→ε−−−−→ in GT
either, which means q 6→. Thus, q is a blocking state in
GT and q 6∈Θnonb(XnG).
• q is a Z state. If q is a deadlock state then 6 ∃θ ∈Θ such
that q θ→ z′ or q θ→w in T . Then based on Def. 24 it holds
that either q
θE(q)−−−→ z′ or q θE(q)−−−→ w does not exist in GT ,
which means q 6→. Thus, q is a blocking state in GT and
q 6∈Θnonb(XnG).
• q is a Y state and q eo→ z′, where z′ is a deadlock Z state.
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Then based on Def. 24 it holds that q eo→ z′ in GT and
eo ∈ Σu. As it was shown above if z′ is a deadlock state
in T then z′ is also a deadlock state in GT , thus removed
by the supervisor synthesis procedure. If z′ is removed,
i.e, z′ 6∈ XnG, then q 6∈Θcont(XnG).
Thus, if q is removed in the pruning of T , then q is also
removed from GT in supervisor synthesis.
(⇐) Now we show that if q 6∈Θnonb(XnG)∩Θcont(XnG), then
q 6∈ Xn+1T and q needs to be removed from T by the pruning
process. If q 6∈Θnonb(XnG)∩Θcont(XnG), there are two cases:
• q 6∈ Θnonb(XnG). Then it holds that q is a blocking state,
which means q α→ does not exists in GT . There are three
possibilities for q, it can be a Y , Z or W state. If q is a
Y state in T then q ∈ Qm in G, which means q ∈ Θˆnonb,
which contradicts the assumption. Thus, q can only be a
W or Z state in T . In both cases from q 6 α→ in GT and
Def. 24, it holds that 6 ∃ρ(α) ∈Θ such that q ρ(θ)−−→ in T .
This means q is a deadlock state in T and q 6∈ Xn+1T
• q 6∈ Θcont(XnG). This means that q
u→ z in GT such that
u ∈ Σu and z 6∈ XnG. Based on Def. 24, this means that q
is a Y state in T and z is a Z state. It was shown above
that if z 6∈ XnG then z 6∈ XnT , which means z is a deadlock Z
state. Thus q will be removed by pruning process, which
means q 6∈ Xn+1T .
Thus, if q is removed by synthesis from GT then q is also
removed from T by pruning. 
Theorem 11 proves that when it comes to imposing the edit
constraint, the pruning process from the largest TPO to the
AES removes equivalent states with the synthesis procedure
of a supremal supervisor. Hence no information is lost when
we apply the supervisory control approach to enforce the edit
constraints and obtain edit functions. This result is essential
to show that the transformation of the TPO to an equivalent
automaton and the constraint Φ to specification K is correctly
done in Def. 23 and Def. 25, respectively. The next step
is to consider the modular representation of the system. In
that case, we will use the transformation in Def. 24, which
results in a set of automata transformations of the individual
three-player observers, with necessary self-loops to capture the
synchronization among the components. Finally, we combine
the results about abstraction and decomposition, which results
in Theorem 12.
Theorem 12: Let G = {G1, . . . ,Gn} be a modular nonde-
terministic system with sets of secret states QSi . Let AES be
the All Edit Structure of G under constraint Φ. Let det(Gi)
and detd(Gi) be the observer and the desired observer of Gi,
respectively. Let ∼o be an opaque observation equivalence on
Gi such that G˜i ∼o Gi for i = 1, · · · ,n. Let Hi,ob ≈o det(G˜i)
and Hi,b ≈ det(G˜i) for i = 1, · · · ,n, where ≈o and ≈ are
opaque bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. Let T ′i be
the largest three-player observer of detd(Hi,ob) and Hi,b for
i= 1, · · · ,n with the event set Σi,T . Let GTi be the transformed
automaton of T ′i and K be the automaton specification. Let
Pe : Ω→ L (G ) be an edit projection and l(ω) be a string
generated by run (Def. 15 and Def. 14). Let S be the
least restrictive controllable and nonblocking supervisor cal-
culated from {GT1 , . . . ,GTn ,K} and let ρ : (ΣGT1 ∪·· ·∪ΣGTn )→
(Σ1,T ∪ ·· · ∪Σn,T ) be the renaming map. Then [∀s ∈ L (G ),
∃t ∈L (S ): Pe(ρ(t))= s]⇒ [l(ρ(t))= fe(s) where fe ∈AES].
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorems 11 and 10,
in combination with Theorem 9. 
Theorem 12 essentially shows the proof for all the steps
shown in Fig. 1. The theorem shows that Algorithm CA-
AES correctly synthesizes edit functions for opacity enforce-
ment in a modular form, therefore, the algorithm is sound.
It also reveals that the problem of calculating the modular
representation of the All Edit Structure can be transformed
to synthesizing modular supervisors. The advantage of such
a transformation is that we may leverage various existing
approaches for calculating a modular supremal nonblocking
supervisor in the literature; see, e.g., [11], [28], [29], [37].
Therefore, we can obtain a modular representation of the All
Edit Structure, which is noticeably efficient to compute. Then
we may synchronize individual components in the Modular
Edit Structure, which results in a subsystem of the monolithic
AES. However, as was pointed out in Section IV, some edit
decisions are omitted after the synchronization. In practice, it
is usually desired to retain the modular structure and extract
an edit function from it, much in the same way as a set of
modular supervisors control a plant. The extraction process is
explained next.
Each step of extracting a valid edit decision is described
in Fig. 5. Here the edit function is an interface between the
system’s output and the outside environment. Assume that the
system outputs event γ , then the edit function makes an edit
decision for that event and the edited string will be output to
the external observers.
Specifically, this process contains the following steps. (1)
when γ is received by the edit function, all the components
of the Modular Edit Structure are in states that correspond to
Y states of the All Edit Structure. (2) At these states, event γ
is executed and states of all the components in the Modular
Edit Structure are updated simultaneously. After the execution
of γ , each component of the Modular Edit Structure is at a
state that corresponds to a Z state of the All Edit Structure.
(3) Then assume there are multiple transitions defined out of
such a current state, we need to select one common transition
which corresponds to a specific edit decision and can be
viewed as making a control decision from the current state.
Note that as the selected transition needs to be accepted by
all the components, thus it may happen spontaneously in all
the components of the system. The solution of the modular
supervisory control problem guarantees the existence of such
a common transition out of the current Z states.
Algorithm CA-AES returns the edited string ρ(σ0 . . .σk) for
event γ when every component of the Modular Edit Structure
reaches a new state corresponding to a Y state of the AES. At
that point, the Modular Edit Structure is ready to process the
next event output by the system, and the above steps repeat.
Meanwhile, the algorithm keeps track of the states of the
Modular Edit Structure as its components evolve. Based on
Theorem 11, the edited string ρ(σ0 . . .σk) is accepted by the
monolithic AES. This finally confirms that the extracted edit
decision from the Modular Edit Structure corresponds a valid
edit decision in the monolithic AES. The above process is
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illustrated in the following example.
Example 7: Consider the nondeterministic system G =
{G1,G2} shown in Fig. 2. As it was shown in Example 2,
the system can be abstracted using opaque observation equiv-
alence. After abstraction, the system becomes deterministic,
which means there is no need to calculate the observers of G1
and G2. The largest three-player observers of G˜1 and G˜2 are
T ′1 and T
′
2 , respectively, shown in Fig. 2. Next, the three-player
observers are transformed to automata GT1 and G
T
2 shown in
Fig. 2, as explained in Example 4.
Assume the user adds an edit constraint such that only
one consecutive erasure is allowed as in Example 6. The
specification automaton of this constraint is K, shown in Fig. 4.
Due to this constraint, the Y states (A,D) and (B,E) are
considered undesired states in T , shown in Fig. 3 and they
should not be reached when we synthesize edit functions.
Since (A,D) is not allowed, its successor states (A,D,α),
(A,D,α→ ε) and (A,E) become unreachable from the initial
state (A,A). Those three states together with (A,D) and (B,E)
are drawn in dashed lines in Fig. 3 and are to be removed in
the next step. Furthermore, states (B,D,α→ ε), (A,C,β → ε)
and (A,B,γ→ ε) become deadlocking after (A,D) and (B,E)
are removed. They are drawn in dotted lines in Fig. 3 and are
also to be removed.
Following the compositional approach with supervisor re-
duction presented in [29], [40], we calculate a least restrictive
and nonblocking supervisor for the transformed automaton,
which is shown in Fig. 4 as automaton S. All the paths
accepted by this supervisor represent valid edit decisions. Con-
sider the accepted path SP shown in Fig. 4, it corresponds to an
edit function’s decisions for string γβα such that fe(γβα) =
γ(γ → ε)γβεβαγ(α → ε)α , which is shown by thick lines
in T , Fig. 3. As is seen, ρ(SP) = fe(γβα). Specifically, when
event γ is output by the system, SP returns γ(γ → εγ)(γγ→ε,w),
which means erasing the γ . Next, event β is output by the
system and it is unchanged according to SP. Finally, α is
output by the system and SP returns α(γα)(α→ εα)(αα→ε,w),
which means erasing α and inserting γ . Similarly, we may
consider other paths accepted by the supervisor in Fig. 4 to
track edit decisions on other strings, then we have a complete
picture of how an edit function works.
Remark 4: From the result in Theorem 8, our modular algo-
rithm CA-AES results in fewer edit decisions compared with
the monolithic approach in [20], due to the synchronization
process in Section IV. This indicates that our method may not
be complete in the sense that even if Algorithm CA-AES does
not return any modular form edit functions, the monolithic
approach may still return valid edit functions. This may be
viewed as the tradeoff of reducing computational complexity
by the modular method. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a compositional and abstraction-
based approach to synthesize edit functions for opacity en-
forcement in a modular setting, given a set of individual
systems. The edit functions modify the system’s output by
inserting and erasing events, under the constraint of limited
number of event erasures. The Three-Player Observer (TPO)
and All Edit Structure (AES) proposed in our prior work
were employed here; these discrete structures embed edit
functions and reflect the constraints. The monolithic approach
first synchronizes all individual systems, then calculates the
monolithic AES to obtain edit functions. In contrast, the
compositional approach first exploits the modular structure
and builds individual TPOs. Then, it incorporates the edit
constraint and calculates the Modular Edit Structure in a
nonblocking modular supervisory control manner to obtain
edit functions. In addition, we also applied abstraction methods
to reduce the state space of the system before opacity en-
forcement. We showed that the abstraction processes preserve
opacity. Combining system composition and abstraction, we
proposed an efficient approach to enforce opacity for complex
systems containing multiple components.
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and (A,B,γ→ ε) become deadlocking after (A,D) and (B,E)
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Following the compositional approach with supervisor re-
duction presented in [29], [40], we calculate a least restrictive
and nonblocking supervisor for the transformed automaton,
which is shown in Fig. 4 as automaton S. All the paths
accepted by this supervisor represent valid edit decisions. Con-
sider the accepted path SP shown in Fig. 4, it corresponds to an
edit function’s decisions for string γβα such that fe(γβα) =
γ(γ → ε)γβεβαγ(α → ε)α , which is shown by thick lines
in T , Fig. 3. As is seen, ρ(SP) = fe(γβα). Specifically, when
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which means erasing the γ . Next, event β is output by the
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which means erasing α and inserting γ . Similarly, we may
consider other paths accepted by the supervisor in Fig. 4 to
track edit decisions on other strings, then we have a complete
picture of how an edit function works.
Remark 4: From the result in Theorem 8, our modular algo-
rithm CA-AES results in fewer edit decisions compared with
the monolithic approach in [20], due to the synchronization
process in Section IV. This indicates that our method may not
be complete in the sense that even if Algorithm CA-AES does
not return any modular form edit functions, the monolithic
approach may still return valid edit functions. This may be
viewed as the tradeoff of reducing computational complexity
by the modular method. 
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forcement in a modular setting, given a set of individual
systems. The edit functions modify the system’s output by
inserting and erasing events, under the constraint of limited
number of event erasures. The Three-Player Observer (TPO)
and All Edit Structure (AES) proposed in our prior work
were employed here; these discrete structures embed edit
functions and reflect the constraints. The monolithic approach
first synchronizes all individual systems, then calculates the
monolithic AES to obtain edit functions. In contrast, the
compositional approach first exploits the modular structure
and builds individual TPOs. Then, it incorporates the edit
constraint and calculates the Modular Edit Structure in a
nonblocking modular supervisory control manner to obtain
edit functions. In addition, we also applied abstraction methods
to reduce the state space of the system before opacity en-
forcement. We showed that the abstraction processes preserve
opacity. Combining system composition and abstraction, we
proposed an efficient approach to enforce opacity for complex
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